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Corporations have received growing criticism for their role in climate change, perpetuating racial and 
gender inequality, and other pressing social issues. In response to these concerns, shareholders are 
increasingly focusing on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria in selecting 
investments, and asset managers are responding by offering a growing number of ESG mutual funds. 
The flow of assets into ESG is one of the most dramatic trends in asset management.  
But are these funds giving investors what they promise? This question has attracted the attention of 
regulators, with the Department of Labor and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) both 
taking steps to rein in ESG funds. The change in administration has created an opportunity to 
rethink these steps, but the rapid growth and evolution of the market means regulators are acting 
without a clear picture of ESG investing.  
We step into this gap by offering the most complete empirical overview of ESG mutual funds to date. 
Combining comprehensive data on mutual funds with proprietary data from the several of the most 
significant ESG ratings firms, we provide a unique picture of the current ESG environment with an 
eye to informing regulatory policy. We evaluate a number of criticisms of ESG funds made by 
academics and policymakers and find them lacking. We find that ESG funds offer their investors 
increased ESG exposure. They also vote their shares differently from non-ESG funds and are more 
supportive of ESG principles. Our analysis shows that they do so without increasing costs or reducing 
returns.  
We conclude that ESG funds generally offer investors a differentiated and competitive investment 
product that is consistent with their labeling. In short, we see no reason to single out ESG funds for 
special regulation.   
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ESG investing – that is, investing informed by environmental, social and 
governance criteria or considerations – is growing explosively.1 Public attention in the 
U.S. and globally has increasingly focused on ESG issues,2 and growing percentage of 
investors consider green investing “a big priority.”3 In one of his first official acts, 
President Biden rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement,4 and the Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has, for the first time, a designated policy advisor to advance ESG 
issues.5 
The growing focus on ESG investing is reflected in the rapidly expanding number 
of mutual funds that purport to consider ESG factors in their investment and voting 
decisions, as well as a surge in the volume of assets invested in such funds. Morningstar 
reports that the number of ESG-focused index funds and the total amount of assets 
held by such funds have each doubled in the past three years.6 The COVID-19 
pandemic, and the disruptions it has caused to financial markets, have done nothing 
to slow this rise.7    
But do these rapidly growing ESG funds deliver what they promise? Do ESG 
funds offer portfolios with real investment exposure to ESG goals, or has the demand 
for ESG investing led to overpriced, greenwashed funds that are merely marketed as 
 
1 See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The 
Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 388 (2020) (explaining that ESG 
investing “is an umbrella term that refers to an investment strategy that emphasizes a firm's governance 
structure or the environmental or social impacts of the firm's products or practices”). 
2 See, e.g., Carlo Maximilian Funk & Suzanne Smetana, The New Normal: ESG Investing in 2021, 
etftrends.com, Jan. 9, 2021, https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/the-new-normal%3A-esg-investing-in-
2021-2021-01-09 (explaining why global developments are likely to make ESG investing “the new 
normal”). 
3 Michael Martin, ESG: a trend we can’t afford to ignore, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2020, 
https://www.ft.com/content/87a922a1-8d60-4295-a9d8-d2c1ab5d788e. 
4 Nathan Rott, Biden Moves To Have U.S. Rejoin Climate Accord, NPR, Jan. 20, 2021, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/inauguration-day-live-updates/2021/01/20/958923821/biden-
moves-to-have-u-s-rejoin-climate-accord 
5 Jim Tyson, SEC appoints policy advisor to advance new initiatives on ESG, CFO Dive, Feb. 2 2021, 
https://www.cfodive.com/news/securities-exchange-commission-esg-Satyam-Khanna-
biden/594369/ (reporting Satyam Khanna’s appointment in a “newly created role as senior policy 
advisor for climate and ESG”). 
6 Pippa Stevens, ESG index funds hit $250 billion as pandemic accelerates impact investing boom, CNBC, 
Sept. 2, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/02/esg-index-funds-hit-250-billion-as-us-investor-
role-in-boom-grows.html. 
7 See generally Lubos Pastor & M. Blair Vorsatz, Mutual Fund Performance and Flows During the COVID-
19 Crisis, NBER Working Paper No. 27551 (Jul. 2020), available at 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27551/w27551.pdf (finding that ESG funds 
did well in terms of both performance and fund flows, during the COVID-19 crisis of 2020); Deike 
Diers & Axel Seemann, Could Covid-19 Open More Doors for ESG Investing? Bain & Company (August 26, 
2020), https://www.bain.com/insights/could-covid-19-open-more-doors-esg-investing-snap-chart/ 
(arguing that the COVID-19 crisis is likely to accelerate the trend towards ESG investing).  
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ESG to chase the latest investment fad?8 The answers to these questions have legal 
implications because mutual funds are extensively regulated by the SEC, and the 
inclusion of mutual funds in retirement plans is regulated by the Department of Labor 
(DOL). 
In fact, both the SEC and the DOL have recently turned their attention to ESG 
investing.9 For the SEC, the central legal question is whether funds that characterize 
themselves as focused on ESG deliver on that promise – do they invest and vote 
differently from other mutual funds?10 For the DOL, the question is whether ESG 
investing is consistent with the fiduciary duties of retirement plan trustees – do ESG 
funds deliver sound performance at reasonable cost or do they sacrifice returns to 
promote social causes? 11 Despite these differing concerns, both SEC and the DOL 
view the growth of ESG funds as potentially warranting regulatory intervention. 
Indeed, the DOL has already intervened, adopting a new rule on October 30, 2020 
that may deter 401k plans from offering ESG funds.12 Although to date the SEC has 
not engaged in formal rulemaking, members of the Commission have expressed 
 
8 See, e.g., Tariq Fancy, Financial world greenwashing the public with deadly distraction in sustainable investing 
practices, USA Today, Mar. 16, 2021, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/03/16/wall-
street-esg-sustainable-investing-greenwashingcolumn/6948923002/ (stating that “sustainable investing 
boils down to little more than marketing hype, PR spin and disingenuous promises from the investment 
community”). 
9 The SEC solicited public comment on whether the use of ESG in mutual fund names is likely 
to mislead investors. Request for Comment on Fund Names, Release No. IC–33809 (Mar. 2, 2020) (85 
FR 13221) (Mar. 6, 2020) (“Request for Comment on Fund Names”). The SEC’s Office of Compliance, 
Inspections and Examinations also identified as a particular interest the “accuracy and adequacy of 
disclosures provided by RIAs offering clients new types or emerging investment strategies, such as 
strategies focused on sustainable and responsible investing, which incorporate environmental, social, 
and governance (ESG) criteria.” Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2020 Examination Priorities, at 15, 
www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2020.pdf. See also 
Department of Labor, Final Rule, Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, Oct. 30, 2020 (“DOL 
Final Rule”) (adopting rule providing that “A fiduciary’s evaluation of an investment or investment 
course of action must be based only on pecuniary factors”). Although the final rule does not explicitly 
reference ESG investing, the DOL explained that its purpose in adopting the rule was “to set forth a 
regulatory structure to assist ERISA fiduciaries in navigating these ESG investment trends.” Id. at 11. 
10 See, e.g., Update on progress in ESG Subcommittee, SEC Asset Management Advisory Committee, 
Sept. 16, 2020, at 17, https://www.sec.gov/files/update-from-esg-subcommittee-09162020.pdf 
(identifying “concerns about the potential for “greenwashing” in ESG funds”). 
11 See, e.g., Rober R. Gower, A Pecuniary Focus: Department of Labor Issues Final Rule on Financial Factors 
in Selecting Plan Investments, Tucker Huss, Nov. 12, 2020, https://www.truckerhuss.com/2020/11/a-
pecuniary-focus-department-of-labor-issues-final-rule-on-financial-factors-in-selecting-plan-
investments/ (“Over the last several years, the DOL has expressed increasing concern that a growing 
emphasis and interest in ESG investing may prompt ERISA plan fiduciaries to make investment 
decisions for motives other than their fiduciary duty to provide benefits to participants and beneficiaries, 
and defray reasonable expenses of administering a plan”). 
12 DOL Final Rule, supra note 9. 
ESG Mutual Funds 
 
5
concerns that current disclosure practices by asset managers with respect to their ESG 
products are insufficient.13  
Other interventions are on the horizon as well. The reliance of asset managers on 
third parties, including index providers and rating agencies in evaluating the ESG 
characteristics of portfolio companies, has led some to call for greater regulation of 
those providers.14 The Biden administration is taking steps to review and potentially 
replace the DOL rule15 and new leadership at the SEC will likely look to expand 
corporate disclosures to address ESG issues.16 
  These changes are taking place, however, amid a rapidly evolving ESG landscape 
that has outpaced the academic literature. Instead, regulators are acting based on a 
variety of assumptions about how ESG funds operate,17 often drawn from small-
sample studies or anecdotal reports.18 Even as regulators move, we know relatively 
 
13 See, e.g., Elad Roisman, SEC Commissioner Advocates ESG Disclosure for Asset Managers, Not Issuers, 
THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, July 10, 2020, https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/07/10/sec-
commissioners-advociates-esg-disclosure-for-asset-managers-not-issuers/ (“I do think that retail 
investors who want “green” or “sustainable” products deserve more clarity and information about the 
choices they have.”). 
14 See, e.g., Dana Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index 
Funds, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1921, 2003 (2020) (warning that “The topic of index regulation looms large 
on the U.S. regulatory horizon”); Elad E. Roisman, Statement at the Meeting of the Asset Management 
Advisory Committee, Dec. 1, 2020, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/roisman-statement-
amac-meeting-120120 (asking Asset Management Subcommittee “to the extent that you are considering 
recommending that the SEC incorporate certain third parties’ disclosure guidelines into our rule set, 
have you thought about how the SEC should oversee those third parties? Also, should we extend our 
oversight further, for example, to ESG-index providers and ESG-rating agencies, since so many “ESG” 
funds and investment products are derivative of their work?”). 
15 See Tim Quinson, Biden Administration Considers Reversing Trump’s ESG Rule Change, 
Bloomberg.com, Jan. 20, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-20/biden-
administration-considers-reversing-trump-s-esg-rule-change (reporting that “The so-called ESG rule, 
or “Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments,” was the only Department of Labor rule listed for 
review by President Joe Biden’s transition team”). 
16 See Aaron Nicodemus, Biden’s SEC set to require disclosure of ESG, climate change risk, COMPLIANCE 
WEEK, Dec. 3, 2020, https://www.complianceweek.com/regulatory-policy/bidens-sec-set-to-require-
disclosure-of-esg-climate-change-risk/29788.article (predicting a Biden Administration SEC will “could 
require companies to disclose risks related to environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues, which 
includes addressing risks associated with climate change.”). 
17 See, e.g., DOL Final Rule, supra note 9 at 8 (“ESG funds often come with higher fees, because 
additional investigation and monitoring are necessary to assess an investment from an ESG 
perspective”). 
18 For example, in the proposed DOL rule on ESG funds in retirement plans, U.S. Department 
of Labor, Financial Matters in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39,113 (June 30, 2020), the footnote 
supporting the claim that “ESG funds often come with higher fees,” id at 39,115 n. 15, cites an 
industry whitepaper, which itself cites to a June 2018 news report about the cost of ESG data (not 
funds). The DOL also cites a whitepaper from a conservative think tank which analyzes only 30 ESG 
funds. Id. (citing Wayne Winegarden, ESG Investing: An Evaluation of the Evidence, Pacific Research Institute 
(May 2019), www.pacificresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESG_Funds_F_web.pdf.). For 
the countervailing claim that “asset-weighted expense ratio for ESG funds has (sic) decreased,” the 
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little about the market for ESG funds, the investment strategies these funds use, how 
they vote their proxies, and what they cost. At the same time, regulatory attention has 
focused on ESG funds as presenting concerns distinctive from other mutual funds. 
But it is unclear that ESG funds, as a category, present unique regulatory issues.19 
These are all policy-relevant questions that should inform rulemaking.    
This article offers the most complete empirical overview of ESG mutual funds to 
date. Using market-wide data on fund portfolios, voting, fees, and performance, we 
specifically target the concerns articulated by the SEC and the DOL. We combine 
detailed information on mutual funds with four proprietary datasets evaluating 
company-level ESG performance. Using this unique and comprehensive dataset, we 
explore the practical differences between ESG and non-ESG funds as well as the 
differences among ESG funds along four dimensions – portfolio composition, voting 
behavior, costs, and performance. The first two specifically target the SEC’s concerns, 
while the latter two relate to those raised by the DOL. Our goal is to provide an 
overview of the market as it currently stands for the purpose of informing a regulatory 
push that has the potential to reshape the ESG landscape.       
From the SEC’s perspective, the fundamental regulatory question is what 
investors are getting for their “ESG dollars.” We confront the question of what ESG 
funds promise – the information conveyed both by the ESG label and fund disclosure 
practices. We then ask whether and how these funds deliver on that promise. To 
answer these questions, we survey the existing market and construct several categories 
of ESG mutual funds – funds with names that convey an ESG-oriented strategy, funds 
classified by Morningstar as ESG funds, and funds that purport to consider ESG 
factors in their investment criteria. We then analyze the portfolio composition and 
voting behavior of these funds to compare them across multiple dimensions. From 
the DOL’s perspective, the primary concerns are pecuniary: what, if anything are 
investors giving up when they invest in ESG funds? These pecuniary costs can be direct, 
in the form of fees, or indirect, in the form of lower raw or risk-adjusted returns. We 
engage with the concerns of both regulators by providing evidence about both what 
investors are getting, and what they are giving up to get it.   
Descriptively, we uncover an evolving landscape of ESG funds. Today’s ESG 
funds range from single issue funds that address water conservation or religious values 
to those that incorporate screening criteria into the construction of a broad-based 
index. We find extensive disclosures of fund investment strategies – strategies that 
 
DOL cites only a news report. Id. By contrast, we present direct evidence on the fees associated with 
more than 300 funds.     
19 Although this article’s empirical analysis focuses on U.S. investing, we note that the growing 
importance of ESG investment products raises regulatory concerns globally. See, e.g., The Regulatory 
Overlay on ESG Investing, Morgan Lewis White Paper, Sept. 2020, https://www.morganlewis.com/-
/media/files/publication/morgan-lewis-title/white-paper/2020/the-regulatory-overlay-on-esg-
investing.pdf (exploring regulatory considerations in the U.S., the United Kingdom, the European 
Union, and Asia.). 
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differ substantially – as well as the extent to which the fund incorporates ESG 
considerations into voting and engagement. We find, in short, a market that recognizes 
that ESG means different things to different investors.    
Empirically, we find that ESG funds behave differently from other funds. We first 
evaluate portfolio composition. Using data from four separate rating providers, we 
calculate what we term a fund’s “ESG tilt” — the asset-weighted average of the ESG 
scores of the fund’s portfolio companies. We find that funds that identify themselves 
as ESG funds hold portfolios that represent a significant ESG tilt. In other words, 
contrary to the SEC’s concern about “greenwashing,” ESG funds deliver on their 
promise to invest differently from other funds, and their holdings are rated more 
highly with respect to ESG. Because we incorporate ratings from four different 
providers, our findings offer reassurance that funds are not “gaming” a specific ESG 
index.    
Second, we examine fund voting behavior. Although ESG mutual funds have 
been criticized for not casting their portfolio-company votes in accordance with their 
investment profiles,20 we document clear differences between the voting behavior of 
ESG and non-ESG funds. Although ESG funds do not automatically support every 
shareholder proposal related to ESG,21 they do vote more independently of 
management compared to other funds when it comes to environmental and social 
issues. With respect to certain governance issues, such as say on pay, we also find clear 
differences. In short, ESG funds appear to be considering ESG criteria in voting, as 
well as investment decisions.  
Third, we look at what this costs investors. To do so, we investigate the expenses 
associated with ESG funds and the returns offered by these funds. Contrary to the 
concern articulated by the DOL, we find no evidence that ESG funds cost more than 
comparable non-ESG funds, or that they offer inferior performance during our sample 
period (either raw or risk adjusted). The results persist despite the inclusion of a battery 
of control variables intended to ensure that we are making “apples-to-apples” 
comparisons. While these tests are not intended to establish – nor can they establish – 
whether or not ESG funds are a “good” investment, we find no evidence that they 
perform worse than comparable funds. 
 
20 See, e.g., James McRitchie, Mutual Fund Wars Over Fees AND Proxy Votes, CorpGov.net, Sept. 3, 
2019, https://www.corpgov.net/2019/09/mutual-fund-wars-over-fees-and-proxy-votes/ (reporting 
that “Morningstar also found ESG funds from BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity Investments, TIAA- 
CREF and others cast a number of votes that appear to conflict with an ESG mandate, especially for 
funds specifically aimed at the environment.”). 
21 We note the absence of any clear benchmark as to the specific percentage of ESG proposals 
that a fund should support given obvious differences in proposal quality as well as firm-specific variation 
in the degree to which the actions contemplated by a given shareholder proposal are necessary or 
appropriate. 
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A final empirical contribution of this paper is to address the impact of variation 
in ESG ratings. As the SEC has noted, there is little consensus on what falls within the 
definition of ESG or how to weigh various ESG considerations.22 There are over 600 
ESG rating providers, and these providers rely on a range of different sources of data 
and employ a variety of methodologies to analyze that data.23 Commentators have 
highlighted the fact that these differences frequently lead to different ratings.24 Thus, 
for example, among automobile manufacturers, Tesla receives a top ESG rating from 
MCSI and a bottom rating from FTSE.25 Although we do not directly interrogate 
differences among providers in this paper, we take the unique approach of 
incorporating ESG rating data from four different and well-known providers — ISS, 
S&P, Sustainalytics, and TruValue Labs — to measure the ESG orientation of the 
mutual fund portfolios that we examine. We find that, although the providers take very 
different approaches to measuring ESG, the patterns are remarkably stable across 
providers.    
In sum, we provide new data on the role of ESG in mutual fund investing and its 
effects. Our goal in this article is modest. We do not seek to establish that ESG funds 
are good with respect to any specific benchmark – good with respect to the myriad 
possibility of environmental, social and governance objectives or good in the sense 
that they outperform non-ESG funds. Rather, the goal of this article is to address 
concerns that ESG funds present distinctive regulatory concerns relative to the mutual 
fund market as a whole, either because (as the SEC fears) they are not doing what they 
purport to do or because (as the DOL fears) their economic performance is inferior 
to non-ESG funds. Either of these concerns, if established, would warrant singling out 
ESG funds for distinctive regulatory treatment. Our empirical results, however, 
provide powerful evidence that ESG funds are offering investors something different 
from traditional funds with respect to both portfolio composition and voting, and that 
they are doing so without causing investors systematically to sacrifice economic 
performance. 
 
22 SEC Commissioner Elad L. Roisman, Keynote Speech at the Society for Corporate Governance National 
Conference, July 7, 2020, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/roisman-keynote-society-corporate-
governance-national-conference-2020. 
23 See, e.g., Jasmin Malik Chua, The rise in ESG ratings: What’s the score?, VOGUE BUSINESS, Oct. 28, 
2020, https://www.voguebusiness.com/sustainability/the-rise-in-esg-ratings-whats-the-score 
(explaining variation in methodologies used by ESG rating organizations).  
24 See, e.g., Jacqueline Poh, Conflicting ESG Ratings Are Confusing Sustainable Investors, BLOOMBERG, 
Dec. 11, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-11/conflicting-esg-ratings-are-
confusing-sustainable-investors (observing that “There are many ways to score a company on 
environmental, social, and governance criteria, making the results difficult to compare”). See also infra 
notes 36-40 and accompanying text.  
25 See James Mackintosh, Is Tesla or Exxon More Sustainable? It Depends Whom You Ask, WALL. ST. 
J. Sept. 17, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-tesla-or-exxon-more-sustainable-it-depends-whom-
you-ask-1537199931. 
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Our findings describe the current state of the market for ESG funds. We do not 
purport to evaluate the claims made by ESG funds in the past. It may be that the 
recent proliferation of ESG products has generated meaningful market discipline. 
Nonetheless, our findings do not suggest a need for regulatory intervention either to 
limit investor access to ESG products or to curtail their use by ERISA fiduciaries. 
I. Background of ESG and the Growth of ESG Mutual Funds 
The Background of ESG 
Interest in ESG stems from increasing public, issuer and investor attention to the 
impact of corporate operations on stakeholders and society more broadly. A range of 
commentators have criticized corporations for prioritizing shareholders at the expense 
of employees and customers.26 The need to address climate change and other 
environmental issues has taken on heightened urgency and led to a focus on the role 
that corporations play in carbon emissions and other environmentally damaging 
activities. Corporations have also faced scrutiny over their role in perpetuating racial 
and gender discrimination, wealth and wage inequality and exploitation of 
disadvantaged groups.27 
The ESG movement generally calls for corporations to incorporate these 
concerns into their business practices. ESG is a rough label for an amalgamation of 
voices, interest groups and substantive concerns, and those advocating greater 
attention to ESG often disagree on the relative importance of the various issues that 
they identify.28 The appropriate benchmark for corporate behavior ranges from 
 
26 See, e.g., Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote 
“An Economy That Serves All Americans,” Aug. 19, 2019, available at 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-
promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans; Business Roundtable Statement, The British Academy 
proposes principles for the age of purposeful business, Nov. 27, 2019, available at 
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/news/british-academy-proposes-principles-age-purposeful-business; World 
Economic Forum, Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, 
Dec. 2019, available at 
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/weforumorgDavosManifesto2020TheUniversalPurposeofaCompanyinth
eFourthIndustrialRevolution.pdf. 
27 See, e.g., Melissa Repko, et al., Hashtags won’t cut it. Corporate America faces a higher bar in a reckoning 
on racial inequality, CNBC, June 12, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/12/action-wanted-
corporate-america-faces-a-higher-bar-on-racial-inequality.html (describing pressure faced by 
corporations to address racial inequality and economic justice). 
28 See, e.g., Thomas Brigandi, Paul Kovarsky & Paul McCaffrey The Seven Asset Owner Approaches to 
ESG, ENTERPRISING INVESTOR, Sept. 5, 2019, 
https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2019/09/05/the-seven-asset-owner-approaches-to-esg/ 
(describing seven different approaches by asset owners to ESG investing). 
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demand that corporations at least consider a broader range of stakeholder and societal 
interests to an exhortation for corporations to “do no harm.”29 
The role of ESG in investing continues to evolve. For some years, investing on 
the basis of ESG considerations was thought to be a preference predicated on ethical, 
political, religious or other objectives rather than an investment strategy grounded in 
financial risk and return.30 Commentators debated whether corporations could do well 
by doing good, and the data generated in response to this debate was mixed.31 More 
recently, an increasing number of scholars and policymakers claim that sustainable or 
ESG investing is associated with better economic performance.32 Max Schanzenbach 
and Robert Sitkoff observe that investors may have different reasons for ESG 
investing and differentiate between ESG investing for moral or ethical reasons, which 
they term “collateral benefits ESG” and ESG investing for risk and return benefits, 
which they call “risk-return ESG.”33 
One challenge to analyzing the relationship between ESG and economic 
performance is the absence of a clear definition of ESG. Acting SEC Chair Roisman 
explains that “there is not consensus on what, exactly, ‘ESG’ means.”34 Stavros 
Gadinis and Amelia Miazad note that ESG’s “wide scope” encompasses a range of 
 
29 See, e.g., Mike Phillips, How To Tell Your Impact From Your Sustainable Investing — And Avoid 
Greenwashing, Bisnow, July 5, 2020, https://www.bisnow.com/london/news/sustainability/how-to-tell-
your-impact-from-your-sustainable-investing-and-avoid-greenwashing-105069 (“For the EU, 
sustainable investment must contribute to environmental objectives in a measurable way or contribute 
to social objectives, must do no significant harm to any social or environmental objectives, and must 
follow good governance practices.”). 
30 See, e.g., Jess Liu, ESG Investing Comes of Age, Morningstar, Feb. 11, 2020, 
https://www.morningstar.com/features/esg-investing-history (explaining that “What we now refer to 
as sustainable investing began with religious groups such as Muslims, Quakers, and Methodists who set 
ethical parameters on their investment portfolios”). 
31 See, e.g., Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate 
Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance, 60 Mgmt. Sci. 2381 (2014) (reporting that high 
sustainability companies outperformed their counterparts in both stock returns and accounting 
performance); Pieter Jan Trinks & Bert Scholtens, The Opportunity Cost of Negative Screening in Socially 
Responsible Investing, 140 J. Bus. Ethics 193 (2017) (finding that negative screens were frequently 
correlated with inferior economic performance); Morgan Stanley Institute for Sustainable Investing, 
Sustainable Reality: Analyzing Risk and Returns of Sustainable Funds, 2019, 
https://www.morganstanley.com/pub/content/dam/msdotcom/ideas/sustainable-investing-offers-
financial-performance-lowered-
risk/Sustainable_Reality_Analyzing_Risk_and_Returns_of_Sustainable_Funds.pdf (studying nearly 
11,000 mutual funds and ETFs from 2004 to 2018 and finding “no financial trade-off in the returns of 
sustainable funds compared to traditional funds.”), 
32 See, e.g., Reiser & Tucker, supra note 14 at 1934 (“data showing ESG investing need not sacrifice 
returns - and indeed may increase them - is beginning to mount”); Alex Edmans, GROW THE PIE: HOW 
GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND PROFIT (Cambridge Press 2020), 3 (“By applying a 
radially different approach to business, enterprise can create both profit for investors and value for 
society”).. 
33 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 390-91. 
34 Roisman, supra note 22. 
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issues from environmental concerns and workplace relationships to “the use of sugar 
in packaged foods.”35 Both the range of potential issues and the scope of data analysis 
required to evaluate a corporation’s performance with respect to those issues have 
fueled the development of an array of private standard-setters that gather ESG data 
and transform that data into company-specific ratings or rankings.36 Today there are 
more than 600 ESG rating organizations and rankings worldwide, and the number 
continues to grow.37 The sheer multitude of ratings organizations makes any attempt 
to rank companies “difficult, and more of an art in certain situations than a science.”38    
Moreover, because organizations vary both in the data that they collect and the 
methodology that they use to incorporate that data, ESG ratings vary substantially 
among providers.39 Some providers rely on questionnaires to collect information from 
issuers, some review issuers’ public disclosures and filings, and some rely on third party 
sources.40 Commentators have documented substantial variation among ratings and 
have, as a result, questioned the viability of evaluating an issuer’s ESG accurately.41 
SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce notes that “the different ratings available can vary 
so widely, and provide such bizarre results that it is difficult to see how they can 
effectively guide investment decisions”42  
 
35 Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 1401, 1414-
15 (2020). 
36 Alan R. Elliott, As ESG Investing Gives 2020 A Sustainable Spin, 50 Best ESG Companies Revealed, 
Investor’s Business Daily, Oct. 26, 2020, https://www.investors.com/news/esg-investing-puts-
sustainable-spin-2020-esg-funds-best-esg-stocks-show/ 
37 Nicolas Rabener, ESG data: Dazed and confused, ETF Stream, Nov. 30, 2020 (citing report from 
“the think tank SustainAbility”). 
38 Elliott, supra note 27. See also Hester M. Peirce, Scarlet Letters: Remarks before the American 
Enterprise Institute, June 18, 2019, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-061819 
(observing that “[n]ot only is it difficult to define what should be included in ESG, but, once you do, it 
is difficult to figure out how to measure success or failure”) 
39 Indeed, our data analysis relies on ratings from four different providers and, as we detail below, 
both the underlying data utilized by these providers and the methodologies used to construct their 
ratings vary significantly. 
40 See generally Donnelley Financial Solutions, The Future of ESG and Sustainability Reporting: What 
Issuers Need to Know Right Now, White paper (2018), 
https://www.dfinsolutions.com/sites/default/files/documents/2019-
01/dfin_thought_leadership_whitepaper_ESG_Sustainability_Reporting_0.pdf , at 7-9 (summarizing 
data used by several major ESG ratings providers). 
41 See, e.g., Florian Berg, Julian Kölbel, & Roberto Rigobon, Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of 
ESG Ratings (May 17, 2020). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438533 (comparing ratings from six 
prominent agencies and reporting substantial differences); Feifei Li & Ari Polychronopoulos, What a 
Difference an ESG Ratings Provider Makes!, Research Affiliates, Jan. 2020, 
https://www.researchaffiliates.com/en_us/publications/articles/what-a-difference-an-esg-ratings-
provider-makes.html; Jim Hawley, ESG Ratings and Rankings All over the Map. What Does it Mean? (2017), 
https://truvaluelabs.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ESG-Ratings-and-Rankings-All-Over-the-
Map.pdf. 
42 Peirce, supra note 38.  
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The Growth of ESG Mutual Funds 
The challenges associated with defining and measuring ESG have not impeded 
its growth as an investment strategy. The use by mutual funds of ESG criteria in 
selecting investments and engaging with portfolio companies is one of the hottest 
investment trends. Over the last four years, investments in the United States in funds 
using ESG data have almost doubled from $22.9 trillion in 2016 to over $40 trillion in 
2020.43  
ESG investing can incorporate several different strategies. One is investment 
screening, in which a fund uses ESG data as a component of its investment decisions. 
Funds may engage in negative or exclusionary screening, in which they exclude certain 
types of companies – oil, tobacco and gambling companies are common examples – 
from their portfolio. Alternatively, funds can engage in positive screening in which 
they limit their portfolios to investments that meet designated ESG criteria. Funds can 
also incorporate ESG data as part of a more comprehensive analysis of an investment, 
what some funds term an “integrated” use of ESG criteria. For example, Vanguard’s 
Global ESG Select Stock Fund describes its ESG strategy as “Regularly including ESG 
factors alongside the traditional investment analysis performed by active fund 
managers. This strategy doesn't require the fund to rule out any company, industry, or 
country simply because it's involved in a business activity that may be objectionable to 
some.”44 
The potential impact of ESG investing on mutual fund investors is increased by 
the ease with which ESG screening can be incorporated into a passive investment 
strategy. The amount of money invested through passive or indexed strategies has 
grown dramatically fueled both by the low costs of indexing and by studies suggesting 
that active strategies do not consistently outperform indexed strategies over time.45 
The extensive number of ESG rating organizations creates a ready tool for an index-
based investment product in which the selection of a mutual fund’s portfolio 
companies is predicated on a rating conferred by an external provider. Thus, for 
example, four of Vanguard’s five current ESG fund offerings are indexed, with their 
portfolio composition tracking several indices created by FTSE Russell.46 Indexed 
mutual funds or ETFs enable funds to offer the cost advantages and scalability 
associated with a passive investment strategy. At the same time, the sponsor of such 
 
43 ESG Data Integration by Asset Managers: Targeting Alpha, Fiduciary Duty & Portfolio Risk Analysis 
(June 2020), Opimas; http://www.opimas.com/research/570/detail/. 
44 Vanguard, ESG investing: Discover funds that reflect what matters most to you, 
https://investor.vanguard.com/investing/esg/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2021). 
45 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: 
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. 17, 19 (2019) (explaining growth of 
market for index funds). 
46 Vanguard, supra note 44; see FTSE Russell, FTSE4Good Index Series, 
https://www.ftserussell.com/products/indices/ftse4good (last visited Feb. 15, 2021). 
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funds essentially delegates the evaluation of portfolio companies to the index 
provider.47  
A second ESG investment strategy is engagement.48 ESG engagement involves a 
fund exercising its power as a shareholder in an effort to cause its portfolio companies 
to perform better on some ESG criteria. Engagement may include the manner in 
which the fund votes the shares of its portfolio companies but can also include more 
proactive measures such as letter writing, meeting management, sponsoring 
shareholder proposals and initiating litigation.49  
A third strategy is impact investing. Impact investing targets companies seeking 
to achieve specific goals that are beneficial to society. Impact investing might target a 
company that produces a clean energy product – such as wind or solar power – or 
alternatively might finance efforts to convert the manufacturing processes of a 
traditional company in an effort to reduce its environmental impact.50  
Notably, the foregoing ESG strategies can be used independently or in 
combination. For example, an S&P 500 index fund, which invests in accordance with 
the composition of the S&P 500 index,51 does not incorporate ESG considerations 
into its stock selection process, but nothing prevents that fund from engaging on ESG 
issues. By the same token, a fund that invests according to ESG criteria could also 
engage on ESG issues but need not do so. Indeed, media reports have highlighted 
instances in which ESG funds do not vote differently, even with respect to ESG issues, 
from non-ESG funds.52  
How funds communicate the role that ESG plays in their investment strategy is a 
separate issue. One obvious tool for communicating a fund’s strategy is its name. We 
 
47 See Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and "Index" Investing, 36 
YALE J. ON REG. 795 (2019) (explaining that index funds delegate stock selection decisions to those 
who construct the index, who retain a substantial amount of investment discretion). 
48 Michelle Edkins at BlackRock defines engagement as “direct communication between investors 
and companies—on environmental, social and governance matters.” Michelle Edkins, The Significance of 
ESG Engagement, ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES, 4 (2014). https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/esg-excerpt.pdf. 
49 See, e.g., Boston Trust Walden, https://www.bostontrustwalden.com/investment-
services/impact-investing/ (describing its engagement strategy).  
50 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3 (explaining that “Many sustainable fund managers — including our 
own — reserve a portion of the portfolio for actively intervening in companies that need an extra nudge, 
using the voting rights that share ownership affords them to try to change the companies from within.”). 
51 See Adriana Z. Robertson, The (Mis)Uses of the S&P 500 (Working Paper, June 29, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3205235 (describing the extensive use of the 
S&P 500 index by mutual funds). 
52 See, e.g., Gita R. Rao, A surprise about some ESG funds — they actually vote against environmental and 
socially conscious resolutions, MARKETWATCH, Dec. 18, 2020, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/a-
surprise-about-some-esg-funds-they-actually-vote-against-environmental-and-socially-conscious-
resolutions-11608306020 (reporting that “some index funds with an environmental, social and 
corporate governance mandate rarely vote in favor of their stated preferences.”). 
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constructed our initial sample of ESG funds, for example, by searching for terms such 
as “sustainable,” “ESG” and “green” in fund names. Using a fund’s name to 
communicate the role of ESG is tricky, however. 
Consider a funded called “XYZ Green Fund.” What information is conveyed by 
the fund’s name? One possibility is that the fund invests in sustainable or green 
industries — solar panel and wind turbine manufacturers or makers of electric 
vehicles. An alternative is that the fund seeks out companies that have environmentally 
responsible practices relative to their industry peers – motivated either by a desire to 
encourage more environmentally responsible practices or out of the expectation that 
such companies will be better positioned to withstand market and regulatory burdens 
that are imposed on environmentally harmful companies in the future. The delivery 
service UPS runs a large fleet of diesel trucks, hardly a “green” business compared to 
wind farms, but if UPS has converted more of its vehicles to electric than competitors, 
then the XYZ Green Fund might buy more of UPS and less of FedEx. Many of the 
companies in this fund’s portfolio would not be “green” in the sense used above, but 
rather retailers, manufacturers, and perhaps even oil companies, that are better situated 
than their competitors to thrive if carbon emissions are restricted. 
There is a third possibility too. Perhaps XYZ Green Fund is an impact fund that 
seeks to make companies greener (either to generate returns or to make the world a 
better place). That XYZ Green Fund might hold a portfolio of particularly egregious 
polluters—industrial dinosaurs that have failed to consider their environmental impact 
at all—and then, through the power of their proxy voting, attempt to induce those 
companies to improve. The portfolio of such a fund would look anything but green in 
either of the above senses, but such a strategy might nevertheless be consistent with 
the “green” name so long as the fund seeks to reform those companies.  
Even setting aside the alternative notions of being a green fund, the question of 
what counts as “green” looms large. There is no settled notion of an environmentally 
responsible company. Is Tesla a green company because it makes electric vehicles, or 
is it not, because it harvests vast quantities of lithium for its batteries? A wind farm 
company might be green because it produces electricity with zero emissions, but what 
if it repeatedly refuses to take straightforward steps to mitigate the impact of its wind 
farms on wildlife?53  What is true of the “E” in ESG is equally true of “S” and “G.” A 
company might be a leader in addressing workplace inequality but fail to oversee child 
labor practices in its supply chain. Funds that purport to consider E, S and G, must 
also consider how to weigh practices across all three categories. Does Facebook’s low 
carbon footprint outweigh its failures in safeguarding customer privacy or its dual class 
 
53 As Commissioner Pierce recently put it “One person’s ecofriendly windmill is another person’s 
bird killer.” Hester Peirce, Remarks by Commissioner Peirce on The Role of Asset Management in ESG Investing, 
HARV. LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV., Sept. 18, 2020, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/18/remarks-by-commissioner-peirce-on-the-role-of-asset-
management-in-esg-investing/. 
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voting structure? Of course, this problem is not unique to ESG investing; there are a 
plethora of different self-described “growth” and “value” funds in the market, and 
different funds sometimes have very different conceptions of what “value” and 
“growth” investing strategies mean.54 Notwithstanding this, no one reasonably argues 
that funds should not be able to use the words “value” or “growth” in their names.  
Obviously a fund name cannot fully explain the fund’s investing strategy. Mutual 
fund companies are required to provide information beyond fund names, however. 
They must share information that enables investors to determine if the fund’s 
conception of ESG matches the investor’s preferences. The SEC’s disclosure 
requirements for mutual funds take a layered approach to disclosure.55  Mutual funds 
disclose a minimum amount of information in the summary prospectus, which is 
typically three to four pages in length.56 Additional information is provided in the 
statutory prospectus and the statement of additional information.57 Funds disclose, in 
these documents, their investment objectives and how they incorporate ESG criteria. 
They disclose whether they follow an index strategy and, if so, the applicable index. In 
many cases, they also disclose their policies regarding voting or engagement. Mutual 
funds are also required to disclose their portfolio holdings on a quarterly basis.58 In 
addition, SEC rules adopted in 2002 require mutual funds to disclose their overall 
voting policies as well as the votes they actually cast at each of their portfolio 
companies. This information is publicly available on Edgar.59  
Commentators have criticized the mutual fund disclosure system on the basis that 
retail investors rarely read the prospectus or other disclosure documents.60 In recent 
 
54 See Robertson, supra note 45 at 825-6 (describing the heterogeneity across different “growth” 
and “value” indices tracked by index mutual funds).  
55 See, e.g., Joseph A. Franco, A Consumer Protection Approach to Mutual Fund Disclosure and the Limits 
of Simplification, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2009) (describing SEC’s mutual fund disclosure 
requirements). 
56 See Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8998, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 28,584, 74 Fed. Reg. 4546, 4549 (Jan. 26, 2009) (to be codified at scattered parts of 17 
C.F.R) (stating that the summary prospectus contains “key information that is important to an informed 
investment decision”).  
57 See generally Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 
1961, 1969-70 (2010) (describing SEC-mandated mutual fund disclosures). 
58 Id. at 1970. 
59 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, EDGAR, Mutual Funds, 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/mutualsearch.html (providing mechanism to search for 
mutual funds and view their proxy voting records). 
60 A 2006 Investment Company Institute survey reported that only thirty percent of recent mutual 
fund investors consulted shareholder reports before their most recent purchase, and only thirty-four 
percent used the fund prospectus. Inv. Co. Inst., Understanding Investor Preferences for Mutual Fund 
Information 12 (2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_prefs_full.pdf. A 2008 
telephone survey reported that nearly two-thirds of respondents who said that they received mutual 
fund prospectuses “rarely” “very rarely” or “never” read them. Abt SRBI, Mandatory Disclosure 
Documents Telephone Survey, July 30, 2008, at 56, https://www.sec.gov/pdf/disclosuredocs.pdf. 
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years, however, internet-based disclosures have become increasingly detailed. In 
addition to providing links to the mandated disclosure documents, funds generally 
provide detailed descriptions of their screening and engagement strategies on their 
websites. Mutual fund companies are starting to post their voting disclosures on their 
websites as well. For example, Vanguard provides a tool that enables investors to 
search, by fund, for the proxy votes cast at each of the fund’s portfolio companies for 
the 2019-2020 proxy season.61 
Concerns over ESG Funds 
As the number and size of ESG funds have grown, a number of concerns have 
been raised about them. Perhaps the most serious concern is that ESG funds falsely 
portray themselves as adhering to an ESG investing (or voting) strategy to attract 
investor money, a practice characterized as “greenwashing.”62 Particularly in the 
absence of consistent data for evaluating the sustainability of individual portfolio 
companies, it is difficult to measure the ESG-orientation of a mutual fund or compare 
the “greenness” of one fund’s portfolio to that of another. As one commentator 
observes, the possibility that investors do not understand what they are buying or are 
being misled by false claims of sustainability raises consumer protection concerns that 
fall into a gap in existing law.63 
Greenwashing is not the only issue. Commentators express concern that ESG 
funds charge higher fees. These fees could reflect the higher costs associated with 
identifying and monitoring investments from an ESG perspective.64 It could also be 
the case that ESG funds are smaller and therefore less able to benefit from economies 
of scale.65 More nefariously, they could be capitalizing on the demand for ESG 
products and charging high fees while providing little incremental value to investors. 
Another concern is that ESG funds sacrifice performance. Commissioner Roisman, 
 
61 Vanguard, How our funds voted, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/how-our-
funds-voted/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2021). 
62 Rachel Evans, How Socially Responsible Investing Lost Its Soul, Bloomberg Businessweek, Dec. 18, 
2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-18/exxon-great-marlboros-awesome-
how-esg-investing-lost-its-way. 
63 Zachary Barker, Socially Accountable Investing: Applying Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management's 
Fiduciary Standard to Socially Responsible Investment Funds, 53 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 283, 286 (2020). 
64 See DOL Final Rule, supra note 9 at 8. See also Principles for Responsible Investment, How Can 
a Passive Investor Be a Responsible Investor? (Aug. 2019), www.unpri.org/download?ac=6729, at 15 (ESG 
passive investing strategies likely result in higher fees compared to standard passive funds); Wayne 
Winegarden, ESG Investing: An Evaluation of the Evidence, Pacific Research Institute (May 2019), 
www.pacificresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ESG_Funds_F_web.pdf, at 11-12 (finding 
average expense ratio of 69 basis points for ESG funds compared to 9 basis points for broad-based 
S&P 500 index fund).  
65 David Kathman, Are Sustainable Funds More Expensive? Morningstar, March 16, 2017, 
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/798280/are-sustainable-funds-more-expensive (“Most ESG 
funds are not very large, so they are not able to benefit from the economies of scale found in funds 
with huge asset bases”). 
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for example, has worried about “the extent to which retail investors understand that 
some of these funds may be prioritizing environmental or social goals above the fund’s 
economic returns.”66 Although early studies provided some evidence for this claim, 
more recent studies suggest that ESG strategies have evolved and that, in recent years, 
ESG funds perform as well or better than non-ESG funds.67  
Critically, ESG criteria and their use in ESG funds are attracting investors: 
investment dollars are flowing into self-described ESG funds. Net flows of assets into 
ESG funds “in 2020 were more than double the total for 2019 and nearly 10 times 
more than in 2018.”68 Many retail investors express strong preferences for ESG 
investing, and the mutual fund market is driven largely by those preferences.69  
A final concern is the variety of ESG funds and the investment strategies they 
offer. ESG funds may be actively-managed or tied to an index. They may focus on a 
small number of companies or offer broad diversification. They may focus on stock 
selection or engage actively with their portfolio companies. And they may offer a range 
of substantive ESG priorities – environmental sustainability, diversity, or ethical and 
religious values – or take a more generalist approach to ESG. This variation may lead 
to investor confusion.70 Dana Reiser and Anne Tucker warn that the dizzying array of 
ESG mutual funds means that investors cannot readily “differentiate between their 
claims of ESG effort or impact.”71 Some commentators have called for increased 
disclosure mandates, such as an SEC requirement that mutual funds disclose how they 
“approach ESG and long-term matters generally, including voting and any 
engagement.”72 Acting SEC Chair Allison Lee has warned that greater regulation may 
be necessary, both to standardize disclosure by ESG fund managers and to “require 
 
66 Roisman, supra note 22. 
67 See Elizabeth Schulze, ‘Sustainable’ investors match the performance of regular investors, new IMF research 
finds, CNBC, Oct. 10, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/10/imf-research-finds-esg-sustainable-
investment-funds-dont-underperform.html (reporting evidence that ESG funds sacrificed performance 
“in the early days” but have evolved to address this sacrifice); Siobhan Riding, Majority of ESG funds 
outperform wider market over 10 years, FIN. TIMES, June 13 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/733ee6ff-
446e-4f8b-86b2-19ef42da3824 (reporting finding that “a sample of 745 Europe-based sustainable funds 
shows that the majority of strategies have done better than non-ESG funds over one, three, five and 10 
years”). 
68 Jon Hale, A Broken Record: Flows for U.S. Sustainable Funds Again Reach New Heights, Morningstar, 
Jan. 28, 2021, https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1019195/a-broken-record-flows-for-us-
sustainable-funds-again-reach-new-heights. 
69 MSCI, Swipe to invest: the story behind millennials and ESG investing, March 2020, 
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/07e7a7d3-59c3-4d0b-b0b5-029e8fd3974b. 
70 See, e.g., Jon Drimmer, Tara K. Giunta & Audrey Karman, ESG Strategies Could Be Misleading 
Investors, Lexology, March 11, 2020, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=46ec13e9-da35-
47c2-8164-abc44bd991d3 (the “growth in ESG investing has led to increased potential for confusion 
among the investing public as to what ESG means for a particular company, fund, or investor.”), 
71 Reiser & Tucker, supra note 14 at 1997. 
72 Andy Green, ESG Disclosure and Corporate Long-Termism, 69 CASE W. RES. 909, 925 (2019). 
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advisers to maintain and implement policies and procedures governing their approach 
to ESG investment.”73 
II. Regulatory Pressure on ESG Funds 
 
 The significant growth in ESG investing has begun to attract the attention of 
regulators. In the past year, both the SEC, which comprehensively regulates mutual 
funds, and the DOL, which regulates the trillions of dollars saved in employee 
retirement accounts,74 have taken action motivated by concerns about ESG investing. 
The SEC sought comments from the public on potential future regulation related to 
the use of ESG terms in fund names.75  In doing so, the SEC raised a number of 
important issues about what, exactly, ESG funds are selling.76 Meanwhile, the DOL 
adopted a rule creating potential legal risk for retirement plans that include ESG 
funds.77 The DOL rule was adopted over vigorous dissent from much of the asset 
management industry, although as of early 2021, its future is uncertain.  
A.  The SEC Names Rule 
The SEC has signaled interest in potentially tightening regulation of mutual fund 
names that suggest ESG investing.78 This interest is motivated by concern about 
greenwashing— that a fund might incorporate labels such as ESG, green or sustainable 
to give investors the false impression that the fund offers ESG exposure when it 
actually invests conventionally.79 In a speech, SEC Commissioner Pierce said, 
“Investors are pouring assets into ESG-labelled investment products, and asset 
managers are churning out new products in response. While the demand for these 
products is clear, less clear is what exactly these investors are buying.”80  In particular, 
 
73 Allison Herren Lee, Playing the Long Game: The Intersection of Climate Change Risk and 
Financial Regulation, Nov. 5, 2020, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-playing-long-game-110520 
74 U.S. Department of Labor, History of EBSA and ERISA, available at 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa.  
75 Request for Comments on Fund Names, supra note 9.  
76 In April 2021, the SEC Division of Examinations released a Risk Alert regarding ESG investing.  
Risk Alert, Division of Examinations, The Division of Examinations’ Review of ESG Investing, Apr. 
9, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/files/esg-risk-alert.pdf. The Alert warned of a variety of deficiencies in 
ESG investing including unsubstantiated claims regarding ESG approaches and proxy voting problems.  
Id. at 4-5.  Although the Risk Alert is a statement by the Division’s staff, not a formal rulemaking, we 
note that it focuses on ESG investment strategies as presenting distinctive compliance risks for 
investment advisers and mutual funds.   
77 DOL Final Rule, supra note 9. 
78 Request for Comments on Fund Names, supra note 9. 
79 See Roisman, supra note 22 (“Another risk that concerns me is “greenwashing”—asset managers 
conveying a false impression to retail investors that a given product is environmentally friendly.”). 
80 Commissioner Hester M. Pierce, Lucy’s Human: Remarks at Virtual Roundtable on The Role 
of Asset Management in ESG Investing Hosted By Harvard Law School and the Program on 
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Commissioner Pierce highlighted the risk of “an asset manager who talks the ESG 
talk, but doesn’t walk the ESG walk.”81 Given the rapidly increasing demand for ESG 
funds, should we be concerned that funds that hold themselves out as pursuing social 
or environmental goals through their names are not actually delivering on those 
marketing promises? 
The SEC’s Names Rule, Rule 35d-1, was predicated on the fact that mutual fund 
names are an important source of information to investors.82 Under Section 35(d) of 
the Investment Company Act, it is unlawful for a fund to use in its name “any word 
or words that the Commission finds are materially deceptive or misleading.”  83 
Originally, the SEC policed naming conventions through staff guidance and occasional 
one-off enforcement actions for particularly misleading funds. In 1996, Congress 
amended the Investment Company Act of 1940 Act to give the SEC explicit rule-
making authority to enforce 35(d).84 As a result, the SEC promulgated the Names Rule 
in 1997 and adopted it in 2001.85  
The Names Rule outlines requirements for the use of certain terms in mutual fund 
names. The most important aspect of the rule is for funds whose name suggests a 
particular type of investment or industry. Under the rule, a fund whose name contains 
a type of security, an industry, or a geographic area must hold 80% of their portfolio 
in investments consistent with the designation.86 Thus, the “XYZ Pharmaceuticals 
Sector Fund” must hold 80% of its assets in pharmaceutical companies and the “ABC 
Bond Fund” must hold 80% bonds.  
This much is straightforward, but the Names Rule excludes from the 80% 
requirement terms that describe a fund’s “investment objective, strategies, or 
policies.”87 Thus, while a “stock fund” must hold 80% stock, there is no requirement 
under the names rule that a “growth fund” hold 80% of its portfolio in assets with any 
particular characteristic. For example, “growth” is an investment strategy that has 
many different connotations. To some, a growth stock is a stock of a company with a 
low ratio of book value to market value of equity.88 To others, it connotes smaller 
 
International Financial Systems (Sept. 17, 2020) https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-lucys-
human-091720. 
81 Peirce, supra note 53. 
82 See Final Rule: Investment Company Names, I.C. Rel. No. 24828, Jan. 17. 2001, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ic-24828.htm (“the name of an investment company may 
communicate a great deal to an investor”).  
83 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34(d).  
84 Pub. L. 104–290, Title II, § 208 (Oct. 11, 1996). 
85 17 CFR § 270.35d-1 (2001). 
86 17 CFR § 270.35d-1(a) (2001). 
87 SEC Release No IC-33809 at 6 (March 2, 2020) available at 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2020/ic-33809.pdf. 
88 This is the standard definition of “growth” in the asset pricing literature. See, e.g., Eugene F. 
Fama and Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds, J. FIN. ECON. 33, 
41 (1993).  
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companies with higher potential returns (often coupled with higher risk).89 Given this 
ambiguity, assessing what counts as a growth stock is far more difficult for a regulator 
than identifying “stock” in a portfolio. While names like “growth” and “conservative” 
are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of securities law and cannot be “deceptive or 
misleading” within the meaning of 35(d), the bright-line requirement of the Names 
Rule does not apply to such language in fund names.90  
Despite the limitations imposed by Rule 35d-1, funds have substantial leeway in 
the names that they choose. Moreover, investors rely heavily on names in selecting 
mutual funds. Studies have shown that when mutual funds adopt a name that is 
associated with a hot investment trend or style, investments into the fund increase 
even if the name change does not reflect any change in the fund’s underlying strategy.91  
The SEC has not updated the Names Rule in twenty years. In 2020, however, the 
SEC issued a request for comment on the rule.92 Among the issues upon which the 
SEC requested comment was the application of the Names Rule to ESG funds. The 
SEC specifically noted potential confusion about whether ESG is an investment type 
(to which the Names Rule would apply) or an investment strategy (to which it would 
not).93   
Lurking behind the naming issue is the genuinely unsettled reality of ESG 
investing. ESG is a rapidly evolving space with numerous strategies pursuing different 
goals in different ways, and investors may not understand the role of ESG in a 
particular fund’s strategy. For that reason, the SEC asked, suggestively, “Instead of 
tying terms such as ‘ESG’ in a fund’s name to any particular investments or investment 
strategies, should we instead require funds using these terms to explain to investors 
 
89 See, e.g., “Growth Stock,” NASDAQ Glossary, https://www.nasdaq.com/glossary/g/growth-
stock.   
90 Id.  
91 See, e.g., Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen & P. Raghavendra Rau, Changing Names with Style: 
Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825 (2005) (finding substantial 
inflows into funds that change their names to look like hot styles); Susanne Espenlaub, Imtiaz ul Haq 
& Arif Khurshed, It’s all in the name: Mutual fund name changes after SEC Rule 35d-1, J. BANKING & FINANCE 
123, 133 (2015); Sadok El Ghoul, Aymen Karoui, What’s in a (Green) Name? The Consequences of Greening 
Fund Names on Fund Flows, Turnover, and Performance, FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS (forthcoming 2020) 
(Funds that changed their name to a more ESG-related name had increased flows but no change in 
performance.). 
92 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Request for Comment, 85 C.F.R. 12,221 (March 6, 
2020). Requests for comment are often precursors to rulemaking. The request indicates that the SEC 
may be looking to revise the Names Rule in the near future. The SEC’s 2020 request for comment 
touched on a number of issues that the SEC staff felt might warrant updating, including the use of 
derivatives in funds to create leverage, the use of hybrid instruments that do not fit neatly into the 
categories of “stock” and “bond,” and the evolution of index funds. 
93 Id. at 9 (“The staff has observed that some funds appear to treat terms such as “ESG” as an 
investment strategy … while others appear to treat “ESG” as a type of investment”).  
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what they mean by the use of these terms?”94 Commissioner Roisman signaled a similar 
concern in a 2020 speech, saying:  
It would make sense to me that asset managers who want to use these 
terms to name their funds or advertise their products should be 
required to explain to investors what they mean. How do the terms 
“ESG,” “green,” and “sustainable” relate to a fund’s objectives, 
constraints, strategies, and the characteristics of its holdings? Are “E,” 
“S,” and “G” weighted the same when selecting portfolio companies? 
Does the fund intend to subordinate the goal of achieving economic 
returns to non-pecuniary goals, and if so, to what extent?95 
Requiring ESG funds to explain their ESG commitments to investors seems 
unobjectionable; even absent regulatory change, funds holding themselves out as ESG 
funds ought to be delivering something different to investors to justify their use of the 
ESG nomenclature. The portfolios of ESG funds should be distinguishable from non-
ESG funds. Similarly, although the voting policies of ESG funds might differ among 
themselves, we would expect ESG funds collectively to vote differently from non-
ESG funds, especially on salient ESG issues.   
B. DOL Fiduciary Duties in Retirement Plans 
Participant-directed retirement accounts, such as 401(k) plans, are among the 
largest holders of mutual funds.96 In a participant-directed plan, the employer provides 
plan participants (employees) with a menu of investment options, and plan participants 
decide how to allocate their money among those options.97 Under ERISA98 and DOL 
regulations, retirement plans are subject to a complex set of rules regarding investment 
selection, plan design, and the obligations of employers in interacting with plan 
assets.99  
ERISA applies trust law to the management of retirement accounts, with plan 
sponsors held to stringent fiduciary duties.100 Under ERISA § 404, fiduciaries for 
employee benefit plans, including retirement plans, must as act prudently to minimize 
 
94 Id. at 15. 
95 Roisman, supra note 22. 
96 Investment Company Institute, ICI Fact Book 2020 
https://www.icifactbook.org/deployedfiles/FactBook/Site%20Properties/pdf/2020/20_fb_table63.
pdf 
97 Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An 
Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 606 (2014). 
98 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.  
99 Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 97 at 614-17. 
100 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). These fiduciary duties are commonly enforced through private class action 
litigation. George S. Mellman and Geoggrey T Sanzenbacher, Center for Retirement Research at Boston 
College, 401(k) Lawsuits: What are the Causes and Consequences? (May 2018) https://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/IB_18-8.pdf. 
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risk to investors, including by diversifying plan assets.101 Fiduciaries must also act 
“solely in the interest” of plan participants for the purpose of “providing benefits to 
participants and their beneficiaries.”102 These obligations track the trust law fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and care.103  
Whether ERISA fiduciaries can properly include ESG funds in retirement plans 
has been the subject of ongoing debate, a debate premised largely on the question of 
whether taking nonpecuniary criteria into account is consistent with ERISA’s 
mandate.104 Different presidential administrations have taken different approaches 
with respect to whether ESG investing is consistent with ERISA fiduciary duties.  
Starting in 1994, the DOL addressed the issue of ERISA plans choosing 
“economically targeted investments,”105 or ETIs, defined as “an investment that is 
selected for the economic benefit it creates, in addition to the investment return to the 
employee benefit plan investor.” The DOL explained that, while fiduciaries need to 
act “solely in the interest of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries and for the 
exclusive purpose of providing benefits to their participants and beneficiaries . . . [t]he 
fiduciary standards applicable to ETIs are no different than the standards applicable 
to plan investments generally.”106 That meant, as long as the ETI investment was as 
good as other options available to the plan, it could be prudently chosen. A plan could 
not, however, accept lower economic returns to pursue collateral benefits.  
The DOL’s guidance on what is now called ESG investing turned more negative 
in 2008.107 The 2008 interpretive bulletin stated that “ERISA’s plain text does not 
permit fiduciaries to make investment decisions on the basis of any other factor than 
the economic interest of the plan.”108 As a result, a fiduciary that weighed collateral 
benefits when choosing an investment risked breaching its fiduciary duties to the plan. 
The sole exception, in view of the DOL, was if after “examin[ing] the level of 
diversification, degree of liquidity, and the potential risk/return” of prospective 
investments, the fiduciary deemed “two or more investment alternatives” to be “of 
equal economic value to a plan” in which case, the fiduciary was permitted to factor 
in the non-economic benefits as a tiebreaker.109 The bulletin’s approach reflected the 
 
101 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 
102 Id. 
103 See e.g., Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 1 at 399-400 (explaining relevant fiduciary 
principles under trust law). 
104 See generally Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 1. 
105 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 59 
Fed. Reg. 32606, 32607 (1994). 
106 Id.  
107 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted Investments, 73 Fed. Reg. 
61734, 61734 (2008). 
108 Id. at 61735. 
109 Id. The bulletin required, in such a case, that the choice “be documented in a manner that 
demonstrates compliance with ERISA’s rigorous fiduciary standards. Supra note 97, at 61734. 
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then-prevailing view that considering ESG factors might benefit society generally but 
would usually come at the expense of returns.110 
In 2015, the DOL withdrew the stricter 2008 guidance, and reinstated the 1994 
articulation of the standard.111 In so doing, the DOL emphasized that just because an 
investment is an ETI or ESG investment does not mean that the investment is of 
limits or “inherently suspect or in need of special scrutiny.”112 A “fiduciary may not 
use plan assets to promote social, environmental, or other public policy causes at the 
expense of the financial interests of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries,”113 but 
may consider ESG investments that meet those criteria without drawing special 
scrutiny or paperwork obligations.  
A Field Assistance Bulletin in 2018 “clarified” the 2015 guidance by offering 
new—and more negative—guidance in how plans can consider ESG factors.114 The 
bulletin warned that an ERISA fiduciary’s use of ESG factors must “be appropriate to 
the relative level of risk and return involved compared to other relevant economic 
factors.”115 Reflecting the increasingly widely held view that ESG factors can be 
relevant to risk and return, the 2018 guidance acknowledged “ESG issues [can] present 
material business risk[s] or opportunities.”116 The guidance noted that if a fiduciary 
deems ESG factors to “present material business risk[s] or opportunities,” then those 
factors “should be considered by a prudent fiduciary along with other relevant 
economic factors to evaluate the risk and return profiles of alternative investments.”117 
In 2020, the DOL raised the stakes by engaging in formal rulemaking, rather than 
sub-regulatory guidance.118 Its proposed rule, issued on June 30, 2020, took a decidedly 
negative view of ESG funds as an asset class. The DOL wrote in the preamble that 
“As ESG investing has increased, it has engendered important and substantial 
questions and inconsistencies, with numerous observers identifying a lack of precision 
and rigor in the ESG investment marketplace,”119 and said flatly that “ESG investing 
raises heighted concerns under ERISA.”120  
 
110 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-398, RETIREMENT PLAN INVESTING: 
CLEARER INFORMATION ON CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE 
FACTORS WOULD BE HELPFUL 2, 17-18 (2018). 
111 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in Considering 
Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65135, 65135 (2015). 
112 Id. at 65,136. 
113 Id. at 65,135. 
114 DOL, Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018-01, Apr. 23, 2018. 
115 Id.  
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Financial Matters in Selecting Plan Investment, 85 Fed. Reg., 39,113 (2020).  
119 Id. at 39,115.  
120 Id.  
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The DOL pointed to the inconsistencies among ESG ratings,121 which it described 
as “vague” to argue that “there is no consensus about what constitutes a genuine ESG 
investment”122 The DOL also pointed to the cost of ESG funds, stating that “ESG 
funds often come with higher fees, because additional investigation and monitoring 
are necessary to assess an investment from an ESG perspective.”123 The DOL cited 
the SEC’s request for comment on the names rule as evidence of the “questions and 
inconsistencies” plaguing the ESG space.124 
Most importantly, the DOL highlighted the concern that ESG funds might be 
affirmatively inferior to non-ESG funds from a pecuniary perspective. “[I]n the case 
of some ESG investment funds being offered to ERISA defined contribution plans, 
fund managers are representing that the fund is appropriate for ERISA plan 
investment platforms, while acknowledging in disclosure materials that the fund may 
perform differently or forgo certain opportunities, or accept different investment risks, 
in order to pursue the ESG objectives.”125  
The DOL’s proposed response to these concerns was to reiterate that a plan may 
not subordinate risk and return to achieve collateral benefits outside the plan. The 
proposed rule explicitly stated:  
Plan fiduciaries are not permitted to sacrifice investment return or take 
on additional investment risk to promote nonpecuniary benefits or any 
other nonpecuniary goals. Environmental, social, corporate governance, or 
other similarly oriented considerations are pecuniary factors only if they present 
economic risks or opportunities that qualified investment professionals would treat 
as material economic considerations under generally accepted investment theories. 
The weight given to those factors should appropriately reflect a 
prudent assessment of their impact on risk and return. 126 
 
The rule would have also barred “the environmental, social, corporate 
governance, or similarly oriented”127 funds from being used as default options in 401(k) 
plans, though such funds were still permissible if their inclusion was based only on 
 
121 See supra section I.B. 
122 Financial Matters in Selecting Plan Investments, supra note 17 at 39,113. 
123 Id at 39,113. 
124 Id. 
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 39,127. Emphasis added. The proposed rule also imposed significant new documentation 
requirements on cases in which fiduciaries used collateral benefits as a tiebreaker. See § 2550.404a-1 
(c)(2) (requiring the fiduciary to “document specifically why the investments were determined to be 
indistinguishable and document why the selected investment was chosen based on the purposes of the 
plan, diversification of investments, and the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries in receiving 
benefits from the plan”). 
127 Id.  
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“objective risk-return criteria, such as benchmarks, expense ratios, fund size, long-
term investment returns, volatility measures, investment manager investment 
philosophy and experience, and mix of asset types” in selecting options for the plan.128 
In short, the DOL’s proposed rule would have subjected ESG investments to 
heightened scrutiny for potential fiduciary breach.  
The proposed rule’s skepticism toward ESG funds was met with withering 
criticism from most of the asset management industry129, garnering more than 8,000 
comments.130 Three months later, on October 30, 2020, DOL adopted a substantially 
modified final rule.131 Significantly, the new rule removed all explicit discussion of ESG 
considerations and dropped the requirement that ESG funds not be used as QDIAs.132 
The revised version still emphasized the need for fiduciaries to base investment 
decisions on pecuniary factors and, as a result, poses some risk to the ESG investment 
space.133 By focusing investment choice on pecuniary factors, it may be difficult for 
funds to rely on ESG ratings unless those all of the criteria underlying those ratings 
are pecuniary in nature.134  
Much remains uncertain about the DOL rule. The revised rule is largely in line 
with the 1994 guidance, and it is possible that fiduciaries will feel comfortable adding 
ESG investments to plans in light of the final rule’s neutral take on the selection of 
ESG investments and the arguments of ESG advocates that ESG is aimed at pecuniary 
goals. On the other hand, plan sponsors might be sufficiently risk averse, particularly 
in light of the threat of private litigation, to simply avoid funds that foreground ESG 
goals. To date, ESG funds are rarely included as an investment option in 401(k) 
 
128 Id. at 39,118. 
129 Gorte, et al., Public Comments Overwhelmingly Oppose Proposed Rule Limiting the Use of ESG 
in ERISA Retirement Plans, (August 20, 2020) available at 
https://www.ussif.org/Files/Public_Policy/DOL_Comments_Reporting_FINAL.pdf 
130 Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments: A Proposed Rule by the Employee Benefits 
Security Administration, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/30/2020-
13705/financial-factors-in-selecting-plan-investments. 
131 DOL Final Rule, supra note 9. 
132 Joseph Lifsics, The Department of Labor’s ESG-less Final ESG Rule, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON 
CORP. GOV., Nov. 24, 2020, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/24/the-department-of-labors-
esg-less-final-esg-rule/. 
133 In addition, the DOL’s skepticism of ESG investing survived in the preamble to the final rule. 
See Karina Karakulova, DOL Finalizes Rule on ESG Investing: Is “Nonpecuniary” a Synonym for “ESG”?, 
Market Integrity Insights, CFA Institute, Dec. 2, 2020, 
https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2020/12/02/dol-finalizes-rule-on-esg-investing-is-
nonpecuniary-a-synonym-for-esg/ (“the Department reiterates throughout the preamble to the final 
rule its numerous concerns about the ‘growing emphasis on ESG investing, and other nonpecuniary 
factors’”). 
134 See id. (warning that “industry participants remain concerned about [the rule’s] chilling effect 
on ESG investing and factor integration, as well as about the integrity of the rulemaking process.”). 
ESG Mutual Funds 
 
26
plans.135 In addition, the status of the rule under the Biden administration is unclear, 
and the media has reported that the administration may reverse it.136 What is clear is 
that the original rule evinced deep skepticism toward ESG investing based on claims 
about cost and performance that are empirically testable. In what follows, we test some 
of the claims that motivate the DOL rule and SEC request for comment.   
III. Empirical Analysis 
This section presents our empirical tests of the differences between ESG funds 
and other mutual funds. We construct several categories of ESG funds. We then 
examine the holdings, voting practices, costs, and performance of ESG funds, and 
compare them with the rest of the mutual fund industry or what we term non-ESG 
funds. To summarize our results briefly, we find that ESG funds generally deliver 
greater ESG exposure in their portfolio allocations than non-ESG funds, that they are 
more likely than other funds to oppose management in the proxy voting, particularly 
when votes are salient to ESG issues, and that they do not cost more or perform worse 
than similar non-ESG funds. Overall, our findings suggest that, on average, investors 
in ESG funds do seem to be getting funds that “walk the walk,” at least to some extent, 
without any material sacrifice in performance or cost.  
Section A describes our data. Sections B and C relate primarily to the issues that 
underlie the SEC’s concerns about ESG funds, namely, the questions of whether 
investors are getting what they think they’re getting when they invest in ESG funds. 
Section B examines the portfolio composition of ESG funds and explores to what 
extent ESG funds invest in companies with higher ESG ratings. Section C turns to 
fund voting behavior and explores the differences between the voting patterns of ESG 
and non-ESG funds. As is appropriate in a regime based on anti-fraud provisions, 
both of these concerns center around investor expectations. Section D then considers 
the DOL’s primary concerns about ESG funds. Unlike the SEC, the DOL’s focus is 
on pecuniary costs and pecuniary performance. We explore fund fees and performance 
to investigate the extent to which these concerns are warranted.  
A. Description of data 
 
1. Data Sources 
 
135 See, e.g., Ron Lieber, How to Get Socially Conscious Funds Into Your 401(k), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/your-money/esg-funds-retirement-401k-plan.html 
(reporting that 2.9% of 401(k) plans offer even a single ESG fund option). 
136 See, e.g., Lewis Braham, Biden Administration Will Reverse the Department of Labor’s Ruling on ESG 
Funds, Analysts Say, BARRON’S, Jan. 31, 2021, https://www.barrons.com/articles/biden-administration-
will-reverse-the-department-of-labors-ruling-on-esg-funds-analysts-say-51612094408 (reporting that 
administration may reverse the rule but that the process could take eighteen months).  
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The market for ESG products has evolved rapidly, both in the number of such 
products offered and in their characteristics. Analyzes that use data from as recently 
as five years ago may not accurately reflect current market realities. Our analysis 
focuses on 2018-2019 because these are the most recent years for which we have data 
available. 
Mutual fund performance and fee data, as well as holdings data, come from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund 
Database, which we obtain through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Mutual 
fund voting data for 2018 and 2019 comes from ISS’s Voting Analytics Database, also 
through WRDS.  
We use two different methods to identify ESG funds.137 First, we screen funds on 
the basis of their names. We identify all mutual funds whose names contained one or 
more of a series of relevant keywords.138 We then hand check this list to ensure that 
all of the funds that it identified have an ESG connotation. From this, we drop funds 
that focus primarily on asset classes other than equities,139 as well as funds for which 
we are missing data. This yields 204 funds, which we refer to as the “ESG name” 
funds. Second, we rely on a list of mutual funds identified by Morningstar as being 
ESG funds. For simplicity, we rely on a list obtained on May 5, 2020. This list contains 
314 funds, but we are unable to match 11 of them with CRSP portfolio numbers. 
Again, we drop funds that focused on asset classes other than equities, leaving 241 
funds, which we describe as the “Morningstar ESG” funds. Because of overlap 
between the two groups, this results in a total of 303 different funds over the sample 
period.140 
In addition to Morningstar ESG funds, Morningstar identifies a group of what it 
calls “ESG Consideration” funds. These are funds that, according to Morningstar, do 
not have ESG as a central part of their investment strategy, but nevertheless mention 
ESG as a factor considered by the fund managers in assessing investment options.141 
These funds do not have names that connote ESG investing, nor do they market 
 
137 Because of data limitations, some of our analyses below involve a subset of these firms. The 
number of ESG funds included in the analysis is indicated in each table.  
138 Examples of these keywords include “esg,” “impact,” “fossil,” and “responsible.” 
139 This includes funds that focus mostly on debt, funds of funds, and funds that focus on 
commodity linked derivatives. We retain funds that invest in a mix of debt and equity, including so-
called “balanced” funds.  
140 We also identified a small number of fund families that we call “ESG families.” These are fund 
families where, using these two approaches at least half of the fund classes in our sample were coded as 
“ESG.” ESG families are families like Calvert and Parnassus that specialize in various forms of ESG 
investing. While not all of the funds offered by these families are captured using either the ESG name 
approach or the Morningstar ESG approach, the specialization of the fund family might reasonably 
cause an investor to think of them as “ESG funds.” We therefore repeat our analysis re-estimate our 
results including all funds offered by ESG families and find consistent results .   
141 Morningstar Sustainable Funds Landscape 2019, p. 3.  
ESG Mutual Funds 
 
28
themselves as ESG funds. While we do not classify these as “ESG” funds, we repeat 
many of our analyses in this section on this set of funds.  
As noted above, hundreds of providers collect ESG data and disseminate ESG 
ratings, and their ratings are only weakly correlated. We are agnostic on whether it is 
possible to measure an issuer’s ESG in a manner that is objectively correct. To address 
this concern as well as the possibility that a particular provider’s approach may be 
idiosyncratic, we incorporate ratings from four leading ESG ratings providers – ISS, 
S&P, Sustainalytics, and TruValue Labs. Providers also differ in coverage, so that some 
portfolio firms will have ratings from some, but not all, of the providers.  
While all four of the ESG ratings that we use involve a comprehensive assessment, 
they employ significantly different data and methodologies. S&P’s ESG ratings rely 
heavily on information obtained directly from the company in question. Rated 
companies are sent a detailed industry-specific questionnaire and scores are based on 
both these responses and other publicly available data.142  
In contrast, rather than beginning with the company, Sustainalytics’s methodology 
during our sample period sought comment from the company in question only near 
the end of its six-step process.143 Its process begins with information collected from 
the company’s own public disclosures, which are then supplemented by reporting 
from NGOs and the media.144 In steps three and four, the data are analyzed, and the 
company is compared against its peers.145 The draft report is prepared and sent to the 
company for feedback before the report is revised and made public.146 For its part, 
TruValue Labs does not incorporate any data that is obtained directly from the 
company in creating its ratings. Instead, it relies exclusively on third party data about 
the company, including reports by regulators, media, analysis, and advocacy groups.147 
TruValue Labs then processes this information using a natural language machine 
learning algorithm to come up with its scores.148 These two features, in combination, 
mean that TruValue Labs is employing both different data and a different analytical 
approach to constructing its ratings, compared to ISS, Sustainalytics, or S&P. We rely 
on TruValue Labs’s “insight” score in our primary analysis. 
Rather than producing a score from 1 to 100, ISS assigns firms a rating from A+ 
to D-, which can be mapped to a score from 1 to 4 (similar to a grade point average). 
The scores are assigned by way of a performance assessment which draws from a pool 
 
142 See S&P DJI ESG Scores, https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/landing/investment-
themes/esg-scores/ (describing the S&P Dow Jones ESG scores). 
143 Sustainalytics’ ESG Rating Research Methodology, Sustainalytics, 4-5 (2017). Sustainalytics has 
revised its process over time. For the most recent version, see ESG Risk Ratings - Methodology Abstract, 




147 https://truvaluelabs.com/why-truvalue-labs  
148 https://truvaluelabs.com/trends/artificial-intelligence  
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of over 800 indicators. Industry plays an important role: the overwhelming majority 
of the indicators ISS uses (approximately 90%) are industry-specific, and the rating 
structure provides different weights to the indicators depending on the industry.149 We 
use the “overall” rating in our primary analysis.  
We use these ratings to construct the “ESG tilt” of fund portfolios. To do so, we 
use the ESG rating of the companies that the fund invests in to calculate the weighted 
average ESG rating of the fund’s portfolio, weighted according to the proportional 
share that each company represents of the fund’s total portfolio. Because we do not 
have ESG ratings by all providers for all the companies that each fund invests in, we 
scale the weights by the proportion of the portfolio for which ratings are available.150 
We refer to this as the scaled weighted ESG score, or simply the weighted ESG score 
for brevity. For robustness, we also use these weighted ESG scores to construct ESG 
percentile scores. These ESG percentile scores capture a portfolio’s relative ranking 
among all the portfolios in our sample in a given quarter. Because they capture slightly 
different things, we use both of these ESG tilt scores in our analysis. 
 
2. Sample construction 
Before beginning our quantitative analysis, we downloaded the prospectuses of 
each of the funds identified using the fund’s name or by Morningstar (either as an 
ESG fund or as an ESG consideration fund). At least two people – one research 
assistant and at least one author – then read each prospectus. What we uncovered was 
a rich and diverse array of different funds.151 Importantly, the way that we know about 
this diversity is precisely because the funds tell investors about it in their prospectuses.  
Each reader independently read and coded the prospectuses for a number of 
features, including the asset class that the fund was targeting (equities, debt, mixed, 
other) as well as the fund’s objective, including whether it was environmentally 
focused, focused on social issues, focused on governance, or some combination of 
these. The readers also noted whether the fund was generic, or whether it has a more 
specific or specialized objective. Throughout, readers made notes about things that 
stood out about the funds, and these notes provide additional texture to our 
understanding of this market. For example, in reading the prospectuses, readers 
noticed a substantial number of religiously motivated funds, which are intended to 
provide investors with the means of investing according to the tenets of a particular 
 
149 ESG Corporate Rating, ISS ESG, 2, on file with authors.  
150 This approach implicitly assumes that any securities in a fund’s portfolio that are not rated have 
a rating that is equal to the weighted average rating of the rest of the portfolio. For robustness, we 
construct alternative versions of both scores where we assign missing securities a score of 0. We find 
the same pattern of results using these alternative tilt measures.  
151 While not all of the funds made it into our sample – for example, we omit bond funds from 
our analysis because bond holders do not have voting rights– they are nevertheless relevant for 
understanding the overall state of the market, and so we include them in this discussion. 
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set of religious belief. Readers also made notes describing some of the more specialized 
funds that they came across, including funds that incorporated concerns about gender 
diversity (like the SPDR SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF) or animal welfare (like 
the Karner Blue Animal Impact Fund).  
After completing the initial coding, we took a second pass through the 
prospectuses to collect information on how the fund described its approach to ESG 
issues when engaging in proxy voting. Here again, we found a substantial amount of 
diversity: some had fund manager-wide proxy voting policies that considered ESG 
matters (to varying degrees), while others had fund-specific voting policies. Some of 
these policies focused on the impact of ESG issues on firm value, while others 
explicitly sought to support ESG improvement. Interestingly, some prospectuses 
explicitly noted the manager’s belief that investors in ESG funds might be particularly 
interested in proxy voting with respect to ESG matters. For example, while BlackRock 
Investment Stewardship (BIS) generally expects companies to effectively manage 
environmental and social risks, in describing the proxy voting guidelines for the family 
of iShares ESG funds (including the iShares ESG MSCI USA ETF), the prospectus 
specifically contemplates “split voting,” where BlackRock would vote differently for 
different funds.152 According to the prospectus, this is based on “an assessment that 
clients invested in the ESG funds may expect more urgent action be taken by the 
company,” and BlackRock’s view that that “it is reasonable to expect that clients 
invested in ESG funds may be less patient with regard to evolution in corporate 
policies on material E&S matters and therefore wish to send a stronger signal to the 
company by supporting a shareholder proposal.”153 This suggests that at least some 
fund managers are attentive to the particularized expectations of investors in ESG 
funds and are seeking to meet these expectations.  
We merge our hand collected information with fund-level data from the CRSP 
Mutual Fund database. This allows us to identify index funds, as well as fund 
objectives154 and other important attributes of the funds in our sample.  
 In Table 1, we provide a breakdown of the ESG funds that were included in our 
final sample. In Panel A, we summarize the number of ESG included in our final 
sample, broken down by how the fund entered our sample. In Panel B, we tabulate 
the number of certain sub-types of ESG funds in the sample. For brevity, we restrict 
the breakdown in Panel B to just the sub-types of funds that we investigate in the 
quantitative analyses in the remainder of this section. Because missing data forces us 
 
152 iShares ESG MSCI USA ETF Prospectus (Form N-1A), Appendix A4 – Supplemental 
BlackRock Sustainable Proxy Voting Guidelines (Dec. 30, 2019) (available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1100663/000119312519316357/d750097d485bpos.htm). 
153 Id. 
154 Examples of the types of objectives captured by the CRSP objective codes are large cap 
domestic equity funds, or domestic equity growth funds. 
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to omit some of these funds from some of the analyses below, we report the number 
of ESG funds that we are able to include for each analysis.  
 
Table 1: ESG Mutual Funds in our Sample 
Panel A: Number of ESG Funds in Final Sample, by Type 
     Identified by Fund Name 204 
     Identified using Morningstar 241 
     Identified using Either  303 
     ESG “Consideration” Funds 274 
Panel B: Selected Sub-Types of ESG Fund 
     “Environmental” Funds    48 
     Indexed ESG Funds  69 
     Specialized ESG Funds  88 
 
B. Portfolio composition 
The first thing that an investor might reasonably expect from an ESG mutual 
fund is a portfolio that is tilted towards companies with better ESG characteristics. 
That is, an ESG fund should hold larger positions in stocks that perform well on ESG 
metrics relative to non-ESG funds with similar investment objectives. We therefore 
investigate the extent to which ESG funds invest in portfolio companies with higher 
ESG ratings. We do this in two ways. First, we simply plot the distribution of ESG 
tilts among ESG funds and compare it to the non-ESG funds in our sample. This 
approach has two major benefits. First, because we are plotting the entire distribution, 
it is easy to see what part(s) of the distribution are driving the difference, if any, 
between the groups. Second, because it is so simple, there is no complex statistical 
analysis required to produce or interpret the results.  
Figure 1 contains histograms using weighted ESG scores from the four different 
data providers. The shaded histograms represent the distribution of ESG funds, and 
the transparent histograms represent conventional funds. “ESG funds” refer to fund 
that either identify themselves as ESG by their name or are identified by Morningstar 
as ESG funds.155 Histograms contain data at the fund x quarter level. Panel A includes 
259 distinct ESG funds, panel B contains 279 ESG funds, panel C contains 243 ESG 
funds, and panel D contains 271 ESG funds. In all cases, the non-ESG funds include 
all funds in the CRSP database (other than those we identify as ESG funds) for which 
we have enough data to produce a portfolio tilt score. The histograms are constructed 
 
155 We do not include treat “ESG consideration” funds as “ESG funds” in this analysis. We analyze 
these funds separately in the regressions reported below.  
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using quarterly fund-level data.156 This means that if a fund appears in the sample for 
a full year, it will appear 4 times in the histograms.157 
 
The striking thing about Figure 1 is the consistency across the panels. Using any of the 
measures of ESG tilt, we find the same general pattern: ESG funds have portfolios 
with higher ESG scores, on average, than non-ESG funds. As we would expect with 
an average, the distributions tend to have a central peak, with bars fanning out on both 
sides. While this general shape applies to both the ESG and the non-ESG funds in the 
sample, the ESG distribution is shifted slightly to the right of the non-ESG 
distribution in all four panels. There is, of course, substantial variation across the 
panels: the pattern is perhaps more visible in panel A, which uses Sustainalytics scores, 
than it is in panel B, which uses scores from TruValue Labs. Panels C and D, which 
use scores from ISS and S&P, respectively, appear to be somewhere in between. In 
panel C, there is a sharp spike of ESG funds slightly above the mean value, but there 
is simultaneous a significant mass of non-ESG funds at the very top of the distribution. 
In panel D, the distribution of non-ESG funds is double-humped, while ESG funds 
are largely missing from the lower hump. Notwithstanding this variation across 
providers, the overall pattern is the same.  
 
156 Note that this is fund, not fund class.  
157 To ensure that funds that appear in our sample for longer periods are not driving our results, 
we construct alternative versions of these histograms using a fund’s average weighted ESG score rather 
than its score each quarter. We find consistent results.  
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Certainly, there are some ESG funds with low ESG tilts (represented by the ESG 
bars towards the left of each of the panels), just as there are some funds that are not 
classified as ESG funds that have high ESG tilts (represented by the non-ESG bars 
towards the right of each of the panels). This raises the question whether there is a 
substantial population of ESG funds that do not exhibit substantial ESG tilt with 
respect to any of our ESG rating services. Even if the average ESG fund has increased 
exposure to strong ESG companies, there could be a group of ESG funds that are 
really conventional funds masquerading as ESG funds. The fact that most ESG funds 
do what they claim to be doing is, after all, cold comfort to an investor who is unlucky 
enough to invest in one that does not. A significant number of such funds could raise 
concerns for regulators.  
To test whether there are a significant number of “fake” ESG funds, we examine 
the funds that fall below varying percentile cutoffs under all four of the ESG measures. 
Of course, this alone would not necessarily demonstrate that the fund is not in good 
faith pursuing an ESG strategy: the fund’s portfolio might score well under a different 
scoring methodology, or the fund might employ its own idiosyncratic ESG analysis. 
Alternatively, the fund might be pursuing an impact strategy in which it invests in low 
scoring firms and then pressures management to do better. So while a low score under 
all four of the methodologies that we use might constitute a red flag, it is not 
dispositive. As it turns out, however, this red flag goes up for very few funds.  
Only two ESG funds are in the bottom 20 percent of tilt for all four data 
providers, and none stays there for the whole sample period. Of course, even two 
funds might be cause for concern if the funds are promising investors something quite 
different from what they are delivering. We therefore return to these funds’ 
prospectuses and websites to investigate how these funds are presenting themselves 
to investors. Both funds are managed by a fund manager that specializes in “impact 
and ESG investments”: one of them is expressly an impact fund, and the other 
commits only to considering ESG factors in portfolio selection. Given this impact 
orientation, it is perhaps unsurprising that the funds sometimes invest in companies 
with low ESG scores.  
Doubling the cutoff to 40 percent implicates only eleven ESG funds, none of 
which remains there for the whole sample period. Even if we raise the cutoff to the 
50th percentile, we find that only 16 funds are consistently below the median, only two 
of which remain there for the entire sample period. This is a fairly striking result: of 
the 280 ESG funds for which we have the data to include in this analysis, and even 
with incomplete insight into ESG exposure, only two ESG funds are not above the 
median ESG tilt at some point during our sample period. This strongly suggests that 
the appearance of ESG funds in the left tail of the histograms above is an artifact of 
the different scoring methodologies used across the four data providers rather than a 
failure to deliver ESG exposure with respect to some identifiable measure.  
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The heterogeneity of ratings approaches also underscores the general consistency 
of the diagrams in Figure 1. Though each ratings provider measures different firm 
characteristics in different ways and the correlation among ratings is relatively low, the 
different ratings consistently show higher ESG exposure for ESG funds when viewed 
in aggregate.  
There are some limitations to simply examining histograms. First, they do not 
easily accommodate the use of control variables to account for other features of the 
mutual funds. Second, this analysis does not, without more, allow us to conduct 
statistical tests to investigate whether observed differences are statistically significant.  
We therefore estimate a series of regressions. As with the histograms, we include 
one observation per fund-quarter in the regressions. In each model, we include CRSP 
objective code-quarter fixed effects.158 This allows us to compare the ESG ratings of 
funds within the same general category, where the “category” is funds classified by 
CRSP as pursuing the same broad investment objective in a given quarter. This is 
important because certain types of funds in certain periods might happen to have 
relatively high or low ESG scores on average. Including this control allows us to make 
apples-to-apples comparisons. For example, we are not comparing the portfolio of a 
growth fund in the fourth quarter of 2019 to the portfolio of a small cap fund in the 
second quarter of 2018.  
We present the results of these regressions in Table 2. We separate ESG funds 
identified by their names from those identified by Morningstar159 and perform the 
analysis separately on the two groups. As a result, Table 2 contains results from 16 
different regressions, each of which represent a different way to ask the question “on 
average, do investors in ESG funds tend to get portfolios with more ESG 
characteristics?” As before, the non-ESG funds in the analysis include all funds in the 
CRSP database (other than those we identify as the relevant category of ESG fund) 
for which we have enough data to produce a portfolio tilt score.160 In Panel A, we 
measure the ESG tilt of a portfolio using weighted ESG scores (consistent with the 
histograms in Figure 1). For robustness, we repeat the analysis using ESG percentiles 
in Panel B.  
The results in Table 2 are strikingly consistent. Using all four ESG ratings, and in 
both panels A and B, we find that ESG funds – whether identified by their names or 
 
158 Including these fixed effects allows us to control for the average behavior of different fund 
styles (i.e., objectives) at each point in time. This is more flexible – and therefore more conservative – 
than just controlling for fund objective. 
159 See supra notes 138 through 141 and accompanying text.  
160 This implies that, for example, a fund identified as an ESG fund by Morningstar but that we 
did not identify as an ESG fund based on its name will be treated as a non-ESG fund for the purposes 
of the regression in columns 1, 4 and 7. While this approach makes it slightly harder for us to find 
statistically significant regression results, it is the fairest way to test whether, for example, funds on the 
Morningstar list are actually different from funds not on that list.       
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Morningstar – have portfolios that are substantially more tilted towards companies 
with high ESG ratings than non-ESG funds. The coefficients on the dummy variables 
are large and highly statistically significant. For example, the coefficient in column 3 
of Panel A (2.2) represents close to the difference between the 75th percentile and 
median (53.6-51.2= 2.4) of the dependent variable and is larger than the difference 
between the median and the 25th percentile of that variable (51.2-49.5=1.7). Similarly, 
the coefficient of 0.1 in column 7 is almost equal to the difference between the 75th 
percentile and median (1.95-1.82=0.13) of the dependent variable in that regression. 
The coefficients in columns 1 and 5 represent 69% and 70% of the difference between 
the 75th percentile and the median of the dependent variables in their respective 
regressions. These relationships are unlikely to be the result of chance: the p-values 
associated with all 16 of the coefficients are smaller than 0.001.  
 
Table 2: ESG Portfolio Tilts- ESG/Non-ESG Funds 
Panel A: ESG Tilt Measured by Weighted ESG Scores     
Sustainalytics Scores TruValue Labs Scores S&P Scores ISS Scores  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ESG Name 1.775***  2.223***  3.048***  0.101*** 
 
 (7.01)  (7.03)  (5.38)  (7.96) 
 














Objective Code x 
Quarter FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N  46,432   46,432   50,658   50,658   41,778   41,778   48,304   48,304  
adj. R-sq 0.071 0.071 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.046 0.046 
Number of ESG 
Funds 
174 200 189 218 164 186 182 211 
         
Panel B: ESG Tilt Measured by ESG Percentile  
 Sustainalytics Scores TruValue Labs Scores S&P Scores ISS Scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ESG Name 12.377***  14.899***  11.873***  13.273***  
 (7.90)  (8.23)  (6.60)  (9.01)  
Morningstar  9.018***  12.355***  9.105***  7.498*** 
  (5.41)  (8.49)  (4.86)  (4.88) 
Objective Code x 
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N  46,432   46,432   50,658   50,658   41,778   41,778   48,304   48,304  
adj. R-sq 0.381 0.380 0.247 0.246 0.263 0.261 0.402 0.399 
Number of ESG 
Funds 
174 200 189 218 164 186 182 211 
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t-statistics, computed using standard errors clustered by fund, in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
This pattern does not hold for the funds Morningstar identifies as “ESG 
consideration” funds. To show this, we repeat the analysis from Table 2 using an 
indicator for the fact that a fund is an “ESG consideration” fund, as identified by 
Morningstar. The results, presented in Table 3, are highly variable. In columns 2, 4, 7 
and 8, the coefficients are positive (although not statistically significant), while in 
columns 1, 3, 5 and 6, they are negative (but again not statistically significant). In other 
words, there is no systematic statistical relationship in either direction. Given this, we 
are unable to make any firm conclusions about the overall ESG characteristics of these 
“ESG Consideration” funds. One possibility is that there could the much more 
variation across funds in this category, making it hard to detect average differences.161  
 
Table 3: ESG Portfolio Tilts – ESG Consideration funds  
Sustainalytics Scores TruValue Labs Scores S&P Scores ISS Scores  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ESG 
Consideration  
-0.117 0.729 -0.798 1.769 -0.793 -1.031 0.008 1.932 
(-0.42) (0.49) (-0.76) (1.34) (-1.30) (-0.70) (0.95) (1.69) 
















YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46432 46432 50658 50658 41778 41778 48304 48304 
adj. R-sq 0.070 0.377 -0.002 0.241 -0.002 0.259 0.045 0.397 
Number of 
ESG Funds 253 253 265 265 223 223 260 260 
t-statistics, computed using standard errors clustered by fund, in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
To summarize, the results in Tables 2 and 3 make clear that, on average, an 
investor in an ESG fund is investing in a portfolio that is more tilted towards 
companies with high ESG scores than an investor in a non-ESG fund. This holds 
whether we identify ESG funds by their names or using Morningstar’s classification. 
At the same time, we find no consistent evidence that funds that are described as 
“considering” ESG hold portfolios with more ESG characteristics. By and large then, 
the evidence suggests, contra the concerns of some at the SEC, that investors in ESG 
funds are getting something more than “greenwashing.” 
Of course, the category of “ESG funds” is extremely broad, and “environmental” 
concerns can be qualitatively different from “governance” concerns. As a result, the 
 
161 We thank Jason Seligman for this suggestion.  
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fact that ESG funds have, on average, portfolios that are substantially more tilted 
towards companies with high ESG ratings does not necessarily mean that investors in, 
for example, environmental funds, are getting a fund with a higher environmental tilt. To 
explore this, we drill down further into environmental funds.162 We manually identify 
environmental funds by reading the summary prospectus of each ESG fund. We 
construct the “E-tilt” of each fund in a manner that is analogous to the ESG-tilt 
measures discussed above, but rather than using the ESG score of the companies in 
the fund’s portfolio, we use each provider’s environmental scores.163 We then estimate 
a version of the regressions presented in Table 2, where the dependent variable is the 
environmental tilt of the fund, rather than the ESG tilt, and the independent variable 
of interest is an indicator variable for the relevant type of environmental funds. While 
we think that this analysis will be informative, we caution that the number of 
“Environmental” funds in these regressions is small, which makes it difficult to draw 
firm conclusions from the regression analysis that follows. As such, we prefer to 
interpret them as providing suggestive evidence. 
  
 
162 We choose environmental funds for this analysis, rather than social or governance focused 
funds, because the category of environmental funds is the most homogeneous of the three. 
163 TVL does not produce an environmental score. Instead, it produces scores for each SASB 
general issue category. We aggregate scores from the following categories to produce the firm’s 
environmental score: Air quality; Ecological Impacts; Energy Management; GHG Emissions; Product 
Design Lifecycle Management; Waste Hazardous Materials; Water Wastewater. 




Table 4: Environmental Portfolio Tilts – Environmental /Non- Environmental Funds 





S&P Scores ISS Scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ESG Name x 
Environmental Fund 
3.723***  1.644  5.488***  0.283*** 
 





1.897*  -1.627  5.128*  0.156*  
(2.10)  (-0.64)  (2.46)  (2.22) 
Objective Code x 
Quarter FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46,432 46,432 50,658 50,658 41,778 41,778 48,304 48,304 
adj. R-sq 0.106 0.106 0.021 0.021 0.004 0.004 0.062 0.061 
Number of E Funds 38 19 41 21 36 18 40 20 
         





S&P Scores ISS Scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ESG Name x 
Environmental Fund 
14.290***  2.058  11.647***  19.336***  
(5.36)  (0.68)  (3.34)  (6.29)  
Morningstar x 
Environmental Fund 
 6.650  -2.556  8.968  9.387* 
 (1.81)  (-0.60)  (1.88)  (2.30) 
Objective Code x 
Quarter FE 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46,432 46,432 50,658 50,658 41,778 41,778 48,304 48,304 
adj. R-sq 0.106 0.106 0.021 0.021 0.004 0.004 0.062 0.061 
Number of E Funds 38 19 41 21 36 18 40 20 
t-statistics, computed using standard errors clustered by fund, in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
 
The results are presented in Table 4. While the results in Table 4 are slightly more 
mixed than those in Table 2, overall they indicate that environmental funds hold 
portfolios with higher environmental scores. Beginning with Panel A, the coefficients 
of interest in columns 1-2 and 5-8 are consistently larger (sometimes much larger) than 
their analogues in Table 2, and the coefficients in those columns in Panel B, moreover, 
are about the same size as their Table 2 analogues. This indicates that using either 
Sustainalytics, S&P, or ISS scores, environmental funds tilt substantially more towards 
companies with high environmental ratings than comparable non-environmental 
funds.    
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The biggest difference is in columns 3 and 4. Here, we find that using 
environmental scores constructed using data from TruValue Labs, environmental 
funds identified using the names (column 3) have a slightly higher environmental tilt 
in their portfolios, although this difference is not statistically significant. Using funds 
identified by Morningstar, we find a null relationship – while the point estimates are 
negative, the t-statistics are quite small, indicating that the relationship is not 
distinguishable from zero. We note that TruValue does not produce and market 
separate environmental scores; their emphasis is on SASB categories. As a result, our 
finding is likely due to our inability to construct an accurate environmental rating by 
identifying and aggregating the relevant SASB categories.  
 
C. ESG Fund Voting Behavior 
We turn next to the question of whether ESG funds vote the shares in their 
portfolio companies differently from non-ESG funds.  Investors in ESG funds may 
expect that they will vote their shares to support ESG proposals which may be 
opposed by management and conventional mutual funds.  The SEC has explicitly 
suggested that some ESG funds fail to follow their stated proxy voting guidelines.164 
The failure of so-called ESG funds to vote differently from non-ESG funds has been 
highlighted as similar to greenwashing, with critics calling out funds for not voting 
their proxies in accordance with their “values.”165  
We note that there need not be a conceptual connection between an ESG stock 
selection strategy and an ESG voting strategy. An ESG index fund may select stocks 
on the basis of an ESG index but the fund’s investment advisor may apply uniform 
voting policies to all the funds it manages, and those voting policies may or may not 
reflect ESG considerations. Indeed, several of the large asset managers are now 
incorporating ESG considerations into their voting decisions for both their ESG and 
non-ESG funds.166  
The likelihood of a connection between stock selection and voting also depends 
on the nature of a particular fund’s ESG mission. A fund that screens against investing 
 
164 Securities Exchange Commission, Division of Examinations, “Division of Examanations’ 
Review of ESG Investing” (April 9, 2021) https://www.sec.gov/files/esg-risk-alert.pdf.  
165 See, e.g., Rao, supra note 52 (stating that the voting by State Street’s Gender Diversity ETF 
“appears inconsistent with the stated fund objectives”). 
166 See BlackRock 2021 Letter to Clients, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/blackrock-client-letter (“Using our new approach to shareholder proposals, in the second half 
of 2020, we supported 54% of all environmental and social proposals, having assessed that they were 
aligned with long-term value”). But see Lucca de Paoli and Alastair Marsh, BlackRock, Vanguard Show 
Little Favor for Shareholder ESG Votes, Bloomberg, Nov. 30, 2020, 
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/blackrock-vanguard-show-little-favor-for-shareholder-esg-votes-
1.1529800 (reporting that BlackRock and Vanguard voted in favor of just 11% and 15% of climate 
resolutions in the twelve months through August 2020).  
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in alcohol or tobacco companies for religious or ethical reasons, for example, might 
not be expected to vote differently on climate change proposals or executive 
compensation from a non-ESG fund. A fund that screens investments based on their 
carbon footprint, however, might also support shareholder proposals that seek to 
address climate change. On the other hand, a fund that has critically evaluated the 
environmental performance of its portfolio companies and invested in those 
companies based on the quality of that performance may not view additional 
shareholder demands in the form of reporting or otherwise to be necessary.  
Although these concerns make it difficult to evaluate the significance of a fund’s 
vote on a specific shareholder proposal, it is reasonable to ask whether, on a broad 
basis, ESG funds vote their proxies differently from non-ESG funds. We examine 
whether there is a difference in the frequency with which ESG funds vote against 
management as compared to non-ESG funds. There are at least three reasons why we 
might expect them to do. First, many ESG funds actively promote their engagement 
activities. That is, they claim to be seeking to persuade corporations to align their 
behavior with ESG values.167 To the extent these engagement activities fail to persuade 
managers, we would expect such funds to disagree with management about issues with 
high ESG salience. Second, fund voting behavior might be more salient to the 
investors in ESG funds than it is to the investors in conventional mutual funds. ESG 
funds market themselves as advancing certain social goals, and their investors may 
expect the funds’ votes to align with those goals. This may lead ESG funds to vote 
against management more often. Finally, ESG funds might simply be more 
independent of management because they are operated by companies that are less 
likely to seek out 401(k) business from their portfolio companies, which is often argued 
to induce funds to toe the management line.  
Without attempting to distinguish these causal stories, we investigate this question 
using the Voting Analytics database from ISS for 2018-19. The database contains more 
than 25,000,000 fund-vote observations during those years on issues including director 
elections, corporate governance changes, say on pay votes, and shareholder proposals. 
For each issue, the database records the management recommended vote as well as 
each fund’s actual vote.  
Because there is no common identifying variable between Voting Analytics (VA) 
and other mutual fund databases, we match VA with ESG funds based on names. Not 
every ESG fund appears in VA (or, in some cases, the name match appears unreliable) 
so our sample of 303 ESG funds is reduced to 231 for analysis of voting patterns.  
 
167 See Khurram Gillani, Cheryl I. Smith & Matthew A. Zalosh, Active engagement: how top ESG 
managers make a difference, John Hancock Inv. Mgmt., June 2, 2017, 
https://www.jhinvestments.com/viewpoints/esg/active-engagement-how-top-esg-portfolio-
managers-make-a-difference (“Today's top ESG portfolio managers are proactive, directly engaging 
with firms and investing in those making the most significant positive impact in a way that potentially 
enhances long-term financial strength.”). 
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We investigate whether ESG funds vote differently by regressing a variable 
indicating that the fund voted against management’s recommendation on a variable 
indicating that the fund is an ESG fund (under either of our definitions). We use 
company-year dummy variables to control for the average characteristics of each 
portfolio company. This allows us to compare ESG funds’ votes with the votes of 
conventional funds at each particular company. This control is important because of the 
propensity of ESG funds—documented above—to hold different portfolios from 
conventional funds. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at the fund level to 
address the correlation among votes coming from the same mutual fund.   
In addition to the controls described above, we include an indicator variable that 
takes the value 1 if the fund is part of an ESG family (more than 50% ESG funds 
based on the CRSP data) or 0 otherwise. This is important because mutual fund voting 
has historically been highly correlated at the family level, with many fund families 
voting in lockstep.  By including separate variables to identify ESG funds and funds 
in ESG families, it is possible to determine whether ESG voting patterns are entirely 
driven by ESG-specialist fund families.   
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Table 5: Likelihood of Voting Against Management 






 (1) (2) (3) 
ESG Fund 
 Indicator  
0.126***  0.020*** 
(4.16)  (3.29) 
    
    
   
    
Enviro Fund  
Indicator 
 -0.036  
 (-1.02)  
    
Enviro Issue  
Indicator 
 -0.064***  
 (-18.63)  
    
Enviro Fund x 
Enviro Issue  
 0.126**  
 (3.07)  
    
ESG Family 
Indicator  
0.271*** 0.387*** 0.238*** 
(7.95) (17.75) (6.16) 
    
Constant 0.460 0.469 0.060 
Firm x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 788,913 788913 14,438,612 
R-squared 0.283 0.282 0.205 
Number of ESG 
Funds 231 223 223 
t statistics, computed using standard errors clustered by fund, in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001 
Table 5 presents the results. Column 1 examines the relationship between 
classification as an ESG fund and the propensity to support shareholder proposals 
over management objections. Notably when a shareholder proposal is included in the 
proxy statement, management virtually always recommends that shareholders vote 
against it.168  The results show that ESG funds are substantially more likely to oppose 
 
168 Typically if management is willing to take the actions required by a shareholder proposal, it 
reaches a settlement with the shareholder, and the shareholder withdraws the proposal from the proxy 
statement. See, e.g., Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 
ESG Mutual Funds 
 
43
management by supporting shareholder proposals than other funds invested in the 
same company.  
These results do not seem to be driven just ESG fund families.  The control 
variable ESG Family is positive and significantly associated with increased propensity 
to vote against management, but the ESG fund indicator still has independent 
predictive value.  In unreported regressions, the association between being an ESG 
fund and voting against management goes through even when all votes from funds in 
ESG families are dropped from the sample.   
Column 2 examines the subset of ESG funds we identify has having an explicit 
environmental focus (“E” funds). Just as there is a tremendous amount of 
heterogeneity across ESG funds,169 “ESG” proposals include a wide variety of issues. 
One would expect environmental issues to be particularly important to funds focused 
on environmental issues, and perhaps less interested in social and or governance issues. 
Once again, these tests focus on shareholder proposals with ESG salience, but this 
regression includes controls for funds with an explicit environmental focus and 
shareholder proposals that raise environmental issues. The results show that E funds 
are statistically no more or less likely than conventional funds to oppose management 
on shareholder proposals in general. However, when the shareholder proposals 
address environmental issues “E” funds are far more likely than other funds to oppose 
management. 
Finally, Column 3 steps outside of the context of shareholder proposals and looks 
at fund votes in uncontested director elections. Funds can express displeasure with 
management by withholding their votes from directors, even when there are not other 
candidates. At many companies, if a majority of votes are withheld, the director must 
resign the board seat.  While shareholder proposals can have an impact when they are 
broadly supported, director elections have immediate, concrete consequences.  
Notably, fund votes against management recommendations in uncontested director 
elections are relatively rare.170 The results in Column 3 show, that ESG funds vote 
differently from non-ESG funds in these elections, with ESG funds and funds in ESG 
 
126 YALE L.J. 262, 279 (2016) (explaining that “settlement of proposals has become a common 
practice.”). 
 
170 Older work finds mutual funds and other shareholders vote to support management and 
management proposals more than 90% of the time. See, e.g. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, 
The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 888 (2010) (reporting that the average 
percentage of shares voted “for” directors in uncontested elections in 2005-2006 was 95%); Jill Fisch, 
Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm Performance, 8 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 106 (2018) (finding that average percentages of shares voted in favor of 
executive compensation plans from 2011 to 2016 was over 90%). This level of support has likely 
declined in recent years. But see Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate 
Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019) (criticizing index fund voting as 
excessively deferential to management).  
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families being sharply more likely to oppose directors.  Overall, ESG funds are about 
twice as likely to withhold votes in an uncontested director election.    
In summary, we find substantial differences between the voting behavior of ESG 
and non-ESG funds. Although our results do not speak to the question of whether 
ESG funds vote against management or in favor of shareholder proposals “enough”, 
there is compelling evidence that they vote differently from their peers, and that a 
typical ESG fund’s mission involves voting policies as well as stock selection.   
 
D. Performance and Fees  
Having established that investors in ESG funds seem to receive, on average, a 
portfolio tilted towards companies with higher ESG scores and distinctive voting 
behavior, we next ask what this “costs” them. We investigate this “cost” in two ways. 
First, we ask whether the fees charged by ESG funds are higher than those of 
comparable non-ESG funds. This represents a direct measure of the cost of choosing 
to invest in an ESG fund. Next, we consider a broader concept of “cost,” which 
includes both risk and opportunity cost. We therefore ask whether the returns offered 
by ESG funds differ systematically from those of comparable non-ESG funds. We 
also adjust these returns for risk, and again look for differences between ESG and 
non-ESG funds.  
As discussed, critics of ESG investing, particularly regulators, are concerned that 
investors that ESG funds may be sacrificing returns or taking on higher costs. For 
example, the DOL investments rule, as originally drafted, identified concerns about 
increasing risk or sacrificing returns to pursue “non-pecuniary” benefits as a major 
issue. Empirical evidence on fund cost and performance can give context to the need 
for regulatory intervention.  
To assess the fees of ESG funds, we regress expense ratios on our identifiers of 
ESG funds and present the results in Table 6. Unlike the tilt analyses, in this analysis 
we use fund class-year level observations, that is, one observation per fund share class 
per year.171 We also include a series of additional control variables and fixed effects in 
the regressions. First, we include objective code-year fixed effects. As in the tilt 
regressions presented in Tables 2 through 4, this allows us to ensure that we are 
comparing “apples-to-apples” by comparing the expenses of funds with similar 
 
171 We do this because while all classes of a fund relate to the same portfolio (and therefore have 
the same ESG characteristics) mutual fund fees and expense vary by class. A single mutual fund with 
one portfolio might offer different share classes at different prices to institutional investors, small retail 
investors, and retail investors with large balances, for example. Moreover, while mutual funds are 
required to report their portfolios on a quarterly basis, fee data are available from CRSP on an annual 
basis. 
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investment objectives at the same time. Because index funds are known to have lower 
fees than actively managed funds, we also control for whether a fund is an index fund.  
In addition to these fixed effects, we include three different controls for size, since 
fund fees are known to vary systematically by size.172 First, we include a control variable 
for the total net asset value of all funds managed by the fund manager. This allows us 
to account for the ability of larger asset managers to spread costs over more total 
dollars invested, for example, because they have more in-house ESG expertise at the 
manager level. Second, we control for the total net asset value of the fund by adding 
up the size of all the classes of the fund. This allows us to account for the fact that the 
managers of larger funds might be able to spread certain costs – such as portfolio 
selection (as well as administrative costs) – across all the classes of the fund. Finally, 
we control for the total net asset value invested in the particular class itself. For all 
three of these variables, we use the natural logarithm of the size, as is common in the 
literature.173 We cluster standard errors by fund (not class). 
  
 
172 Mutual funds enjoy economies of scale at both the fund level and the sponsor level. Vanguard 
founder Jack Bogle testified before Congress that there are “staggering” economies of scale in the 
mutual fund industry. Statement of John C. Bogle, Mutual Fund Industry Practices and Their Effect on 
Individual Investors: Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, 108th 
Cong. 73 (Mar. 12, 2003), https://archives-financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031203jb.pdf at 9, 
John A. Haslem, Mutual Fund Economies of Scale: Nature and Sources, 20 J. WEALTH MGMT. 97 (2017) 
(explaining sources of economies of scale based on expense types).  
173 We omit the coefficients on the size controls to keep the exposition from becoming cluttered 
and to keep the focus on the variables of interest. As expected, however, we find that funds offered by 
larger fund managers have lower fees, on average, as do larger fund classes. Controlling for both the 
size of the fund class and the size of the fund manager, we find that larger funds tend to have slightly 
higher fees. 




Table 6: Expense Ratios - ESG/Non-ESG Funds 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
ESG Name -0.00049   
 (-1.47)   
Morningstar   0.00017  
  (0.70)  
Morningstar 
Consideration 
  0.00079*** 
  (4.31) 
Class Size Control Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Size Control Yes Yes Yes 
Manager Size Control Yes Yes Yes 
Objective x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Index Fund FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52,592 52,592 52,592 
Adjusted R-squared 0.340 0.340 0.341 
Number of ESG 
Funds 178 218 249 
t statistics, computed using standard errors clustered by fund in parentheses. * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The results in columns 1 and 2 show no evidence that ESG funds – identified in 
either of the two ways – are more expensive, as measured by their expense ratios, than 
non-ESG funds. This suggests that while investors in these funds are receiving 
portfolios that have a greater ESG tilt, on average, they are not paying for it through 
higher expenses. Column 3, in contrast, suggests that the ESG consideration funds 
identified by Morningstar do charge investors more than their competitors. 
Interestingly, these are funds that, according to the results in Table 3, do not exhibit 
higher ESG tilt than mutual funds generally.  
Next we turn to returns, both raw and risk adjusted. There is a vigorous ongoing 
debate over the impact of ESG investing on economic returns.174 Much of this debate 
has centered around individual companies. That is, scholars and practitioners have 
asked whether the stocks of companies with strong ESG scores are likely to 
outperform the market. The performance we are interested in capturing here is not at 
the individual company level, but rather at the mutual fund level. This is important 
because the general performance of high- and low-ESG stocks may not be fully 
informative about mutual fund performance.175  
We do not seek to settle the question of whether ESG investing is an advisable 
strategy here. ESG encompasses a vast number of potential strategies, and advocates 
point to benefits that they believe will accrue over a very long time-horizon, both of 
which make empirical evaluation of ESG investing a thorny topic.176 Our goal is much 
narrower and more modest: to evaluate whether the empirical claims that underlie the 
DOL’s concerns about the inclusion of ESG funds in 401(k) plans is supported by the 
evidence. In other words, we look at ESG fund performance over our sample period 
for evidence suggesting that investors in such funds are bearing short-term costs in 
terms of reduce performance or increased risk.  
To do so, we estimate similar regressions as the expense ratio regressions 
presented in Table 6, except that here we use returns as the dependent variable in 
columns 1 through 3. In columns 4 through 6, we adjust these returns for risk by 
computing Sharpe ratios. An investment’s Sharpe ratio, defined as its return divided 
by its standard deviation, is a common risk adjusted performance measure.177 
 
174 See supra note 31.  
175 See, e.g., Nina Röhrbein, ESG risk in a portfolio context, IPE Magazine, April 2010, 
https://www.ipe.com/esg-risk-in-a-portfolio-context/34522.article (distinguishing between ESG risk 
at specific issuers and “the link between ESG and the risk/return profile of an entire portfolio”).  
176 In addition, some investors may be willing to sacrifice economic returns in favor of social 
factors. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare not Market 
Value, 2 J. L. FIN. & ACCOUNTING 247 (2017) (arguing that corporations should seek to maximize 
shareholder welfare, not stock price, and to incorporate shareholders’ social preferences into their 
objective function). 
177 Generally, return in excess of a proxy for a risk-free investment (such as US treasuries) is used 
in computing a Sharpe Ratio. We abstract from this for simplicity: because our time period is so short 
and the return on risk-free investments was so low during our sample period, the additional 
complication is not warranted.  
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Intuitively, the Sharpe ratio captures the incremental return that an investor receives 
per unit of risk. A higher Sharpe ratio therefore implies a higher risk-adjusted return. 
Because return data are available at the monthly level, we use fund class x month level 
observations and objective code x month fixed effects. Similar to Table 6, we control 
for objective codes178 and whether or not the fund is an index fund using fixed effects, 
and we include the same three controls for size (manager, fund, and class).179 We 
cluster the standard errors by fund and month. The results of these regressions are 
presented in Table 7. 
  
 
178 Because we are using monthly data here, we use objective code x month fixed effects.  
179 As with Table 6, we omitted the coefficients on the size controls from the table to simplify the 
presentation of the results. In the regressions, we find that large fund classes are associated with better 
performance in all six columns. In a few of the specifications, larger funds (aggregating across classes) 
are associated with better raw (but not risk-adjusted) performance. The rest of the size controls are not 
statistically distinguishable from zero.  
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Table 7: Returns and Sharpe Ratios - ESG/Non-ESG Funds 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ESG Name 0.00214*   0.04917*   
 (2.62)   (2.80)   
Morningstar   0.00090   0.01647  
  (1.86)   (1.62)  
Morningstar 
Consideration 
  0.00127**   0.02667** 
  (3.43)   (3.06) 
Class Size 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Size 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager Size 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Objective x 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Index Fund 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 721305 721305 721305 721186 721186 721186 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.651 0.651 0.651 0.780 0.780 0.780 
Number of 
ESG Funds 
202 234 260 201 233 259 
t statistics, computed using standard errors clustered by fund and month, in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The results in Table 7 suggest that investors in ESG funds do not give up returns 
– either raw or risk adjusted. If anything, investors in these funds might do a bit better, 
on average, than investors in non-ESG funds. Both returns and Sharpe Ratios are 
higher for funds identified as ESG by their names (columns 1 and 4), and the point 
estimates are also positive for the funds identified by Morningstar, although the results 
are not statistically significant. Interestingly, the funds that consider ESG also do better, 
on average, than non-ESG funds, although the magnitudes are smaller (roughly half 
as large) than the funds identified by their names.  
ESG Mutual Funds 
 
50
As we did in the portfolio tilt analysis, where we drilled down and looked 
specifically at environmental funds, we repeat our analyses of costs and performance 
focusing in on certain specific types of ESG funds. Here, we focus on two categories 
of funds. First, we investigate the differences, if any, between indexed ESG funds and 
actively managed funds with respect to fees and performance. Second, we investigate 
whether there are differences between “generic” ESG funds and specialized funds in 
terms of costs and performance. For the sake of brevity, rather than including four 
additional tables, we omit the tables showing these results.  
We begin by splitting out indexed ESG funds from their actively managed 
competitors. We then repeat the analyses in Tables 6 and 7, this time including a 
variable indicating that a particular ESG fund is indexed. Because we are already 
including a variable to control for whether a fund is an index fund, adding in this new 
variable effectively allows us to answer the question: apart from any difference we 
would expect to see between index funds and actively managed funds, do indexed 
ESG funds behave differently from actively managed ESG funds, in terms of either 
expenses or performance? 
The answer, with respect to fees, is no. Whether identified by their names or by 
Morningstar, we find no statistically significant difference between the actively 
managed ESG funds and the index ESG funds. Of course, this does not mean that 
indexed ESG funds charge the same fees as their actively managed counterparts. 
Instead, it simply means that their fees do not appear to be different from what we 
would expect, given all the other controls we include, from other index funds.  
Turning to the performance analyses, we find that ESG index funds (whether 
identified by Morningstar or their names) perform slightly better than actively 
managed ESG funds. This incremental performance boost is statistically significant at 
the 5% level with respect to raw returns (the analogue to columns 1 and 2 in Table 7), 
and is marginally significant (i.e., significant at the 10% level) with respect to Sharpe 
Ratios, or risk-adjusted performance. Again, this result is on top of any performance 
differential we see on average between actively managed funds and index funds.  
What about highly specialized ESG funds? These are funds like the Fidelity 
Women’s Leadership Fund, or the LKCM Aquinas Catholic Equity Fund. While these 
funds have highly varied goals, purposes, and strategies, what they have in common is 
that the product they are selling to investors is much more specific than a “generic” 
ESG fund. While there are a relatively small number of these funds in our sample 
(compared to generic ESG funds), they have received a disproportionate amount of 
attention. To study the fees and performance of these funds, we repeat the analysis 
presented in Tables 6 and 7 a third time, this time including a variable indicating that 
the fund in question is both an ESG fund (as identified either by its name or 
Morningstar, as appropriate) and that it is a highly specialized ESG fund. Including this 
variable allows us to investigate whether these highly specialized funds behave 
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differently, in terms of fees or performance, than generic ESG funds, given all the 
other controls we are including.  
While the small number of funds in this category suggests caution in interpreting 
our result, our findings are quite favorable for specialized funds. Beginning with fees, 
we find that if anything, these specialized funds have lower expenses, once we include 
all our control variables, than either non-ESG funds or even generic ESG funds, 
although this difference is only statistically significant when we identify funds using 
the Morningstar list. Turning to performance, we find no statistically significant 
difference in any of the four specifications (using raw returns or Sharpe Ratios, where 
ESG funds are identified by their names or with the Morningstar list). While the 
relatively small number of specialized funds in the analysis180 means that these results 
should be interpreted with caution, there is certainly nothing to suggest that there is 
cause for concern, let along regulatory intervention.  
Overall, the results in this subsection indicate that ESG funds, on average, do not 
cost investors more than comparable funds in terms of higher fees, reduced returns, 
or diminished risk-adjusted performance. To be clear, these results do not imply that 
ESG funds are a superior investment to ordinary funds, and the question of whether 
ESG investing outperforms conventional investment strategies is beyond the scope of 
this paper.181 There is simply nothing in our results that suggests that ESG funds are 
worse than conventional funds when it comes to costs, returns, or risk. Given that the 
DOL’s primary focus in its ERISA rulemaking is on prudent decision making, it is 
therefore hard to see why ESG funds should be singled out for particular scrutiny. 
ESG consideration funds present a more puzzling set of questions. ESG 
consideration funds do not hold themselves out as using ESG as a central part of their 
investment thesis. Instead, they typically commit only to considering it, often among 
many other factors, and this is typically only disclosed in their prospectuses rather than 
highlighted in their marketing materials. Their portfolios show no obvious ESG tilt 
relative to conventional funds, and their fees are higher, though their performance 
 
180 For the performance analysis, there are 64 and 43 specialized funds in the regressions using 
names and the Morningstar list, respectively. Because of missing data on expenses for a few funds, these 
figures are 60 and 43 for the expense analysis. 
181 We note, as well, that our data allow us to explore this question with respect to a limited time 
period.  Other factors likely contribute to our results, such as the high performance of the technology 
sector and the poor performance of the oil and gas sector. See, e.g.,  Esther Whieldon, Robert 
Clark & Michael Copley, ESG funds outperform S&P 500 amid COVID-19, helped by tech stock boom, S&P 
GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE,  Aug. 13, 2020, 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/esg-funds-
outperform-s-p-500-amid-covid-19-helped-by-tech-stock-boom-59850808 (noting that ESG fund 
performance was “buoyed in part by the funds' heavy weighting in large technology company stocks 
that have seen their own strong performance”); Siobhan Riding, Majority of ESG funds outperform wider 
market over 10 years, FIN. TIMES, June 13, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/733ee6ff-446e-4f8b-86b2-
19ef42da3824 (observing that “ESG funds’ low exposure to oil and gas gave them an edge at a time 
when energy stocks suffered steep losses”). 
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seems to offset these fees at least during our sample period. ESG consideration funds 
appear to be a different category of fund from “true” ESG funds. At the same time, 
the very fact that the commitment these funds make to their investors in terms of ESG 
investing – which may be buried somewhere in the fine print of the fund’s prospectus 
– is only to “consider” ESG alongside other factors should lower the level of concern 
these funds might pose to regulators. On the other hand, it remains unclear why these 
funds make such a commitment at all.182 
 
IV. The Implications of These Findings for Regulatory Policy 
It is not surprising that the rapid expansion of ESG funds and the introduction 
of significant number of new products would attract the attention of regulators. 
However, our findings suggest that a regulatory response specifically targeted to ESG 
funds is unwarranted. Specifically, our results stand in contrast to the criticisms of high 
costs, reduced performance, and greenwashing and generally point to a market that is 
working. 
Importantly, we do not argue that ESG investing is an optimal or even advisable 
strategy. There is a significant literature on ESG investing as an asset management 
strategy and evaluating the long-term prospects of the numerous iterations of ESG is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we simply observe that we find no glaring 
evidence of problems in the ESG space from the perspective of the regulatory 
mandate of either the SEC or the DOL. The ESG sector of the fund market seems to 
be functioning no worse than other parts of the mutual fund industry.  
In this section, we describe the implications or our results for the criticisms of 
ESG and current regulatory interventions and advance a suggested framework for 
regulators. We argue that regulators should adopt a presumption against ESG-specific 
interventions in the absence of clear evidence of ESG-specific problems. If there are 
issues with transparency around names or problems with fund costs, regulators should 
begin by questioning whether those issues are unique to ESG funds before making 
 
182 It is possible that mutual funds purport to consider ESG not to market themselves to investors 
but to ward off negative reactions to their size and growing influence in the capital markets. See, e.g., 
Robin Wigglesworth & Richard Henderson, Vanguard and the US financial system: too big to be healthy?, FIN. 
TIMEs, Jan. 12, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/9414052a-3142-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de 
(observing that Vanguard’s “deepening control over the stock market could at some point become 
unhealthy”); John C. Coates IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337 (warning that in the future roughly 
twelve senior money managers will have power over most US public companies); Lucian Bebchuk & 
Scott Hirst, The Spector of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721 (2019) (arguing that large asset managers 
are excessively deferential to management). A working paper by Jeff Schwartz argues that mutual fund 
complexes engage in stewardship out of fear of public retribution if they fail to do so. See Jeff Schwartz, 
“Public” Mutual Funds, working paper (2021) (on file with authors). 
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new rules targeting this particular segment of the market. Our results suggest that, 
given the current state of the market, the answer to that question is generally “no.” 
A. Responding to the Critiques of ESG Funds 
As noted above,183 critics have identified numerous concerns about the growth of 
ESG mutual funds. They have questioned whether ESG funds live up to their names 
by providing investors with a different (and more sustainable) portfolio of investments 
than non-ESG funds. They have chastised ESG funds for failing to vote and engage 
in a manner that is consistent with their ESG mission. They have criticized asset 
managers for greenwashing – using an ESG name or describing an investment strategy 
as an excuse to charge investors higher fees. And the Department of Labor, in 
particular, has worried that fiduciaries will cause their beneficiaries to sacrifice returns 
by choosing or offering ESG-oriented investments. 
A. The Empirical Picture 
We interrogate the empirical basis for these concerns and find it lacking. Although 
our analysis does not speak to the issue of whether ESG funds are a better investment 
option than non-ESG funds, either from an economic perspective or otherwise, we 
find that investors in ESG funds largely get what they pay for. ESG funds genuinely 
offer their investors different portfolio and different voting policies that seem 
generally aligned with ESG goals as measured by ESG ratings. At least in recent years, 
these funds do so without higher fees, lower returns or increased risk. There is no 
evidence, in other words, that ESG funds are not performing on ESG-specific matters, 
or that they are any worse than the rest of the mutual fund market on matters that are 
not ESG-specific.  
To be fair, our analysis focuses on the past several years, and the market for ESG 
mutual funds is evolving rapidly. Over the past several years, the number of ESG 
investing options and the total quantity of assets invested in ESG funds have both 
exploded. The patterns we document may well be the result of increased competition 
in the market for ESG funds. It may also be a response to scrutiny by the financial 
media and regulators and the prospect of regulatory action for high fees or false claims. 
But if that market has improved, then critics and regulators should note that 
improvement. Potential problems in the market from years ago should not drive 
today’s regulatory interventions. When focusing on the ESG market as it currently 
stands, many of the critiques of ESG lack empirical support.  This could, of course, 
change as the market evolves, but taking the market as it is, there seems to be little 
need for action.   
The role of third-party information providers in improving the market is notable. 
Morningstar and ESG ratings providers have constructed extensive disclosure 
mechanisms well beyond what regulations require. These evaluations are inputs into 
 
183 See section I.C, supra.    
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our empirics and our results should provide some comfort that this privately-ordered 
system of information production is succeeding in providing useful information to 
investors.184 While the proliferation of ESG ratings has drawn some criticism, it is clear 
that the market is responding to investors’ desire for more information about ESG 
factors without regulators stepping in.185  
Our observations are important in that capital market regulation poses ongoing 
challenges. Market participants place a premium on innovative new products, and 
regulators are often slow to identify and respond to market trends. Regulatory 
responses must be flexible enough to allow new developments while nonetheless 
protecting against market disruption, misallocation of capital and outright fraud. 
Although it is difficult to extrapolate from a single example, the characteristics we 
document with respect to today’s ESG funds offer a promising story for capital market 
regulation. Existing disclosure requirements, market competition, third party 
information providers, and the prospect of enforcement action appear to have offered 
investors sufficient protection against the potential for abuse in connection with the 
introduction of a new product. The regulatory regime that governed these funds, 
moreover, was generic: the funds were not subject to specialized, ESG-specific 
regulation during this time. And importantly, the mutual fund market is a largely retail 
market and, as such, this protection did not depend on intermediation by more 
sophisticated investors.  
B. The Pecuniary Benefits Debate 
Much has been made of the possibility that ESG funds pursue social benefits at 
the cost of returns to investors. The distinction between collateral-benefit ESG and 
risk-return ESG drawn by Schanzenbach and Sitkoff 186 was part of the motivation for 
the DOL rule, and SEC Commissioner Roisman cited the concern that funds might 
be sacrificing returns without explicit disclosure to investors.187  
If certain ESG funds are explicitly making decisions that sacrifice returns, that 
information should be disclosed to investors. And indeed, some funds do disclose on 
their websites that their investment strategy might lead them to sacrifice returns.188 
 
184 Portfolio companies, and some investors, have called for standardization of ESG disclosures 
in order to reduce (from the companies’ point of view) the duplicative effort that goes into answering 
surveys from various ratings providers and (from the investors’ point of view) ensure that information 
is produced in a consistent way. These concerns might provide a reason for the SEC to provide a single 
disclosure framework, but the motivation would not be that investors in retail mutual funds are not 
getting the information they need to make informed decisions.  
185 Indeed, the proliferation of ratings providers may well be a response to the breadth of the 
market. Investors may vary substantially in the nature of the information they seek. In addition, other 
stakeholders, including consumers, employees and policymakers also consumer ESG information.  
186 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 1. 
187 See, supra note 66. 
188 For example, the Calvert Balanced Fund states on its website and in its prospectus that 
“Investing primarily in responsible investments carries the risk that, under certain market conditions, 
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Having done so, these funds provide fiduciaries with clear and explicit notice that their 
investment strategy might not be appropriate for an employer-sponsored pension plan 
under ERISA. There is no need for any sort of ESG-specific rule here: plan sponsors 
can straightforwardly apply standard fiduciary principles in light of this disclosure and 
might reasonably exclude the fund from a 401(k) menu.  
But the vast majority of ESG funds argue that ESG ultimately creates long term 
value for investors: “doing well by doing good.” The claim that ESG can act as a hedge 
against long-term risks like climate change that may be excluded from conventional 
financial analysis is hard to test empirically, but the question of the long-term benefits 
of ESG investing would be far more pressing if there was evidence that investors are 
bearing short-term costs in pursuit of those benefits.  
While our analysis clearly relies upon a relatively short evaluation window, we find 
nothing to contradict this claim. If anything, ESG funds perform a little better than 
other funds (net of costs) and cost about the same. Of course, these industry-level 
measurements are not substitutes for evaluating individual funds as suitable 
investment options, but if ESG funds as a category do not seem to be making short-
term sacrifices, the case for subjecting them to special scrutiny, as the originally 
proposed DOL rule sought to do, seems weak even if one is skeptical of the long-term 
prospects of ESG factors.   
The DOL should be conscious of a countervailing risk as well. If including ESG 
funds in retirement plans carries heightened risk for plan sponsors, such funds may 
simply be excluded from plan menus. ERISA fiduciary duties are backed by a private 
right of action and plaintiffs’ attorneys have enjoyed success in a recent wave of 401k 
lawsuits alleging excessive fees.189 This has led 401k plans to simplify and streamline 
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their menus,190 often dropping high-fee options. Few will lament striking high cost-
funds from plan menus,191 but our results show that ESG funds offer something 
different from conventional funds without increased costs. Deterring plan sponsors 
from offering such funds risks harming investors financially if some version of the 
ESG investment thesis turns out to be correct. More broadly, many savers want options 
attuned to ESG issues, and offering these options may be a critical ingredient in 
encouraging younger investors to save.192    
C. The Puzzle of ESG Consideration Funds 
Finally, we are puzzled by the empirical picture of so-called ESG consideration 
funds. These funds do not foreground ESG values in their name or marketing but 
claim to consider ESG as part of their overall investing strategy in their prospectus or 
other disclosures. These funds are more expensive than other funds (though their 
short-term performance is also better) and exhibit no discernible ESG tilt. These funds 
are also more numerous than “real” ESG funds. 
Because ESG consideration funds do not aggressively market themselves as ESG 
funds, concerns about greenwashing or investors being misled are more subdued. If 
ESG consideration funds do not ultimately deliver much ESG tilt, they also never held 
themselves out as doing more than weighing ESG factors. On the other hand, if 
mutual fund complexes are touting their consideration of ESG in an effort to avoid 
challenges to their power to affect corporate decision-making or public retribution for 
the exercise of that power, the accuracy of their claims may be of concern.193 
It is fair to ask though, what ESG consideration funds are doing. Where ESG 
funds often provide some clarity on their overall ESG strategy, ESG consideration 
funds leave investors (at least those who are somehow aware of the nature of these 
funds) guessing as to precisely how ESG factors come into the equation, if they do at 
all. Ironically, concerns about insufficient disclosure and high costs commonly directed 
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at ESG funds would appear more suitably directed at ESG consideration funds that 
do not even foreground their ESG commitment to investors.  
D. The Diversity of ESG Ratings 
Our results also shed light on the broader ESG ecosystem. Some critics have 
called out the variety and low correlation of ESG ratings as suggesting that ESG 
investing lacks discernible content.194 If the key ratings providers cannot agree about 
what is important or how to measure it, then how can ESG work as an investment 
strategy if it takes those ratings as an important input? If an investment strategy cannot 
be precisely characterized, what prudent person would choose to pursue it?195    
From an investor point of view, however, it seems less important that ESG ratings 
agree about individual companies than that they have some consistency at the portfolio 
level. If we can agree what counts as an ESG fund, then maybe there is less need for 
precision in determining what counts as an ESG company. This portfolio-level 
consistency is, in fact, what we find. While ratings are heterogenous, ESG funds tend 
to have higher ESG-tilt across the ratings we measure.  
This is consistent with two possibilities. ESG fund managers might be diversifying 
across ESG ratings in portfolio selection, so that they exhibit ESG-tilt regardless of 
the ratings-provider used to evaluate the fund. Alternatively, it may be the ESG fund 
managers are engaging in their own independent evaluations of companies so that their 
portfolios exhibit a commitment to ESG in aggregate that the various ratings providers 
successfully measure, despite micro-level disagreement about individual portfolio 
companies. 
Neither of these hypotheses is consistent with greenwashing, or even a form of 
“lazy” ESG investing where fund managers simply delegate portfolio management to 
ESG rating providers. Instead, it is most consistent with the idea of fund managers 
taking the information contained within these ratings into account in making their 
investing decisions either explicitly or implicitly through independent research – 
exactly what the funds have been promising.    
Some commentators have criticized fund sponsors for taking advantage of a “low-
regulation environment” to offer an opaque and “dizzying array of ESG products.”196 
But, as with concerns over the heterogeneity of ESG ratings, why should we worry 
about numerous, divergent ESG funds when our results suggest that essentially all of 
these funds provide a degree of ESG tilt with respect to at least one set of ESG ratings? 
There is no consensus about what ESG investing means or precisely how to do it, but 
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ESG funds are doing something measurable and consistent with broad ESG ratings. To 
demand more precision is to hold the rapidly evolving ESG market to a standard that 
is simply not applied to other types of funds. There is not great consternation over 
disagreement about what a “growth” fund is, what counts as a “growth” stock, or that 
different “growth” funds might take materially different approaches. On what basis 
should ESG be singled out?    
E. An ESG-Neutral Agenda for Regulators 
Our results suggest that the market for ESG mutual funds is functioning 
reasonably well, and regulators should be responsive to that reality. It may be that the 
ESG fund market of, say, five years ago, consisting of a much smaller number of funds, 
lacked sufficient competition and transparency to enable effective decision making. 
But with ESG entering the mainstream, regulators are faced with a more mature, 
competitive market and ever-improving disclosure practices in which investors seem 
to be getting the information they need.  
In our view, the most productive approach regulators can take when it comes to 
ESG funds is to adopt a presumptive stance of “ESG neutrality.” Many of the critiques 
of ESG funds might be made with equal force against other types of funds. When 
faced with a critique of ESG funds, regulators should ask first whether there is an 
empirical basis for singling out ESG funds, or if the purported ESG issue is one that 
affects the entire fund market.  
Notably, this is more or less the approach that the Department of Labor ultimately 
took in their rule on financial considerations in asset selection for retirement plans. 
The initial draft of the rule evinced considerable skepticism toward ESG strategies and 
emphasized that such funds could only be included in plans if fiduciaries conducted 
sufficient diligence to establish that such funds would ultimately generate an optimal 
trade-off of risk and return for investors.197 The DOL’s preface to the proposed rule 
cited many of the criticisms of ESG outlined above and was read by many in the 
industry to create a presumption against the use of ESG factors in retirement plans.198 
This singling out of ESG sparked significant criticism of the rule from asset managers 
who viewed ESG as integral to portfolio management.  
In the final version of the rule, the DOL all but abandoned explicit mention of 
ESG and instead focused on the types of diligence that prudent fiduciaries should 
conduct before selecting an investment option, regardless of the strategy.199 While the 
DOL emphasized the need to produce financial benefits through asset appreciation—
rather than benefits to other constituencies—in the context of an ERISA plan, the 
ultimate rule did not explicitly target fiduciaries’ use of ESG factors. Despite this 
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ostensibly neutral approach in the text of the rule, the DOL made its skepticism of 
ESG investing clear in the preamble, concluding that ESG investing “raises heightened 
concerns under ERISA.”200 Similarly, the SEC’s Risk Alert for ESG Investing, 
suggesting that ESG products and services pose distinctive risks.201 
In our view, neutrality rather than special scrutiny is the correct approach. Take 
the Names Rule as an example. It is certainly the case that ESG terminology in a fund 
name provides investors with limited information about a fund’s approach. But this is 
true of many other broad descriptions of fund strategies that are commonly used: 
“growth,” “capital preservation,” “blue-chip” all connote strategies in broad terms but 
are hardly concrete. Without taking a position on the need for further regulation of 
names, it is certainly plausible that investors would be served by increased disclosure 
around the use of these kinds of terms in fund names. It could well be that revising 
the 20-year-old names rule makes sense, but the vagueness of ESG-names seems no 
worse to us than other types of names suggesting investment strategies. 
We find no evidence that “sustainable” funds present a more pressing 
informational problem than more conventional terms like “growth,” or that investors 
are more likely to be misled by one name than the other. In the absence of such 
evidence, a narrow fixation on ESG names seems misguided. If investors receive too 
little information to understand what a particular “sustainable” fund seeks to do, the 
SEC should ask whether disclosures around investment strategies and objectives not 
subject to the Names Rule’s 80% requirement are insufficient for all funds, ESG or 
not. 
V. Conclusion 
ESG investing is more important than ever, and ESG mutual funds are the 
primary mechanism by which ordinary people can engage in ESG investing. 
Regulators, academics and the financial media have raised concerns, however, about 
the growth of ESG mutual funds and the substantial asset flows into such funds. 
Among the concerns are that labeling a fund with the term ESG is potentially 
misleading, that asset managers may be exploiting investor demand to charge excessive 
fees, that an orientation toward ESG sacrifices economic value and that ESG funds 
do not vote their proxies in accordance with their values. These concerns have already 
resulted in new DOL regulation as well as the prospect of further regulatory 
intervention by the SEC. The prospect of regulation targeted specifically at ESG 
mutual funds will likely make it more difficult for mutual fund sponsors to provide 
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these investment options and for employers to include ESG mutual funds in their 
401(k) plans. 
We collected data on ESG funds and provided a framework for interrogating 
these concerns. Our empirical results provide no justification for regulatory invention. 
Simply put, analysis reveals that, at present, ESG funds do not present distinctive 
concerns from either an investor protection or a capital markets perspective. Funds 
that market themselves as employing an ESG investment strategy invest and vote 
differently from funds that do not purport to do so. ESG funds do not appear to be 
charging investors higher fees or sacrifices returns relative to their traditional 
counterparts. Our findings suggest caution in curbing the marketing of ESG products 
or limiting their use by ERISA fiduciaries. 
